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‘This is a pre-edited work and has been accepted for publisher in The Common 
Market Law Review' 
 
Limits rising, duties ascending: the changing legal shape of Union citizenship  
 
Niamh Nic Shuibhne  
 
 
 
This article demonstrates that there has been a distinct shift towards the rising 
significance of conditions and limits, and a less explicit but discernible ascension of 
duties, in the application and interpretation of citizenship rights. Articles 20 and 21 
TFEU provide for the restriction of rights by both primary and secondary law, but 
the extent to which this now occurs calls into question the existence, and not just the 
exercise, of the foundational primary rights. The article argues that there has been a 
hegemonic attribution of supremacy to secondary law that fails to engage the 
constitutional protocols epitomising the Union legal order more generally.  
 
  
                                                     
 School of Law, University of Edinburgh. An early version of this paper was presented at the 
iCourts Research Centre, University of Copenhagen in November 2014; thanks to the 
participants for comments, especially to Oddny Arnardottir and Urška Šadl. Thanks also to 
the CMLRev editors, and to Graeme Laurie, Tobias Lock, and Daniel Thym.  
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1. Introduction 
  
Article 20 TFEU establishes that ‘[c]itizens of the Union shall enjoy the rights and be 
subject to the duties provided for in the Treaties’. But it also stipulates that such 
rights ‘shall be exercised in accordance with the conditions and limits defined by the 
Treaties and by the measures adopted thereunder’. Similarly, while Article 21 TFEU 
confers the right to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States 
on all Union citizens, it does so ‘subject to the limitations and conditions laid down 
in the Treaties and by the measures adopted to give them effect’. Following these 
provisions, secondary law may therefore not only expound the scope and substance 
of primary rights; it can also restrict scope and substance – creating a potentially 
problematic circularity since secondary law must, in turn, be reviewed against the 
content of relevant primary rights. EU legislation has long addressed aspects of the 
right to move and reside, but Directive 2004/38 1  attracts particular significance 
because it was drafted – and is therefore being implemented, applied, and 
interpreted – after the conception of Union citizenship. But how far can the primary 
right to move and reside be conditioned and limited by secondary law; what are the 
duties that balance the rights of citizenship; and who gets to decide?  
In Grzelczyk, the Court characterised citizenship as the ‘fundamental status of 
nationals of the Member States’.2 In Huber, AG Poiares Maduro argued that ‘[w]hen 
the Court describes Union citizenship as the “fundamental status” of nationals it is 
not making a political statement; it refers to Union citizenship as a legal concept 
which goes hand in hand with specific rights for Union citizens’.3 Building on that 
premise, Thym describes the concept as ‘an overarching idea supporting status 
convergence by way of interpretative or legislative approximation of the diverse 
legal rules for the different categories of Union citizens’.4 His interpretation usefully 
                                                     
1 Directive 2004/38/EC on the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move 
and reside freely within the territory of the Member States, [2004] OJ L158/77. 
2 Case C-184/99 Grzelczyk, EU:C:2001:458, para. 31.  
3 Opinion of AG Poiares Maduro in Case C-524/06 Huber, EU:C:2008:194, para. 19 (emphasis 
in original).   
4 Thym, ‘The elusive limits of solidarity: residence rights of and social benefits for 
economically inactive Union citizens’ (2015) 52:1 CMLRev 17 at 18. 
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disentangles critical elements of free movement rights. There are different categories 
of Union citizen (e.g. mobile/static) and diverse rules apply to them. Codifying those 
rules is the basic purpose of the Directive, which establishes levels of rights linked to 
duration of residence in a host State. This ‘gradual system’5 has both temporal and 
material dimensions: it is constructed around significant time-points and important 
substantive differences are also relevant – depending, in particular, on whether 
citizens are economically active in the host State.  
However, the impact of these distinctions is contained through recourse to an 
overarching idea with the aim of status convergence. While the convergence aim 
inherent in a ‘fundamental’ status might represent an ideological vision or aspiration 
– whether on the part of the Court of Justice or more generally, remembering that the 
phrase is also found in the preamble to the Directive – it has made a powerful 
contribution to the empirical development of citizenship rights. In particular, the 
Court instituted a framework at the level of primary law against which rules either 
directly targeting or indirectly revealing differences between categories of citizen 
had to be reviewed. Any differences identified between categories of citizen were 
often tempered as a result, an outcome justified by reference to the effectiveness of a 
citizenship status – of a Union – founded on equal treatment. In this way, drawing 
especially from the resource of proportionality, the Court managed to mediate the 
conferral of primary rights by the Treaty and their qualification through secondary 
law. Both ‘halves’ of the Article 21 TFEU equation were sustained. The Court has 
been criticised for extending both the idea and implications of Union citizenship too 
far in the foundational case law. However, it must be acknowledged that the Court 
created substantive rights at the level of primary law when it did so. 
We have largely focused on the development of rights to debate whether a 
free movement paradigm that is truly citizen-distinctive has materialised in EU law. 
But reflecting more consciously on the package of concepts in Articles 20 and 21 TFEU, 
this article recasts the legal narrative by accenting conditions, limits, and duties 
instead. The argument that emerges has two key strands. First, there has been a 
profound shift in emphasis towards the rising significance of conditions and limits, 
                                                     
5 Joined Cases C-424/10 and C-425/10 Ziolkowski and Szeja, EU:C:2011:866, para. 38. 
 4 
and a less explicit but discernible ascension of duties, in the application and 
interpretation of citizenship rights. Second, the legal shape of citizenship is changing 
as a result. Constitutional choices have consequences, especially when they alter an 
established template for the protection of substantive primary rights. In some 
respects, exploiting conditions, limits, and duties is an uncontroversial mapping of 
the Directive. 6  Judicial respect for legislative choices is a standard expectation, 
underscored by the wording of the Treaty. But it is argued here that the legal shape 
of citizenship has mutated beyond what the legitimate effecting of the ‘gradual 
system’ of rights actually requires. The basic constitutional instruction in Articles 20 
and 21 TFEU is distorted too acutely when we also invert the starting-point from 
rights to restrictions. In essence, the primary-ness of Union citizenship rights has 
imploded. Crucially, it will also be shown that neither the adoption nor the coming 
into force (in 2006) of the Directive marks, as might be anticipated, the decisive point 
of change. First, the tipping point is more recent. Second, it will be demonstrated that 
the interpretative methods contributing to this generational case law shift outstrip 
application of the Directive, involving its inflation and disruption too.  
As a result, notwithstanding the consolidation and simplification aims of 
Directive 2004/38,7 an amplified splintering of citizenship rights has occurred. Three 
distinct concerns are identified. First, both hardening and generalisation of 
conditions, limits, and duties are pervasive. Second, these steps are sometimes taken 
in disregard of the Treaty requirement that duties should be provided for, and limits 
and conditions should be laid down. Third, there has been a hegemonic attribution of 
supremacy to secondary law, which fails to engage the constitutional protocols 
epitomising the Union legal order more generally. The erosion of a proportionality-
driven approach to resolving certain citizenship claims exemplifies the latter point.  
In Section 2, the conventional legal narrative on conditions, limits, and duties 
is briefly outlined. The dominance of rights over limits – and of primary law and 
general principles over secondary law – distinguishes this formative case law from 
the account characterised by mutation presented in more detail in Section 3. Three 
                                                     
6 See e.g. Ziolkowski and Szeja, paras 39-41; Case C-333/13 Dano, EU:C:2014:2358, paras 70-73. 
7 See recitals 3 (‘to simplify’) and 4 (‘remedying this sector-by-sector, piecemeal approach to 
the right of free movement and residence’) of the preamble. 
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clusters of cases – on social assistance, permanent residence, and protection against 
expulsion – are analysed to demonstrate the scale of the shift. In Section 4, the idea of 
the ‘tolerated’ citizen is then used to convey the reduced status of and support for 
citizens seeking to transition between the calcifying tiers of citizenship.  
Overall, recent case law raises questions about the extent to which the 
existence and not just the exercise of free movement rights has been undermined and, 
therefore, whether the claim of Union citizenship as a fundamental status grounded 
in meaningful primary rights can really be sustained.  
 
2. Convention: the orthodox approach to conditions, limits, and duties  
 
At the time of its inception, three sets of conditions and limits restricted the 
movement and residence rights of Union citizens. First, the Treaty provided Member 
States with authority to refuse admission to or expel Union citizens on grounds of 
public policy, public security, and public health.8 States were always compelled to 
construe these derogations narrowly9 but ‘a particularly restrictive interpretation…is 
required by virtue of a person’s status as a citizen of the Union’.10 Second, various 
interpretative limits were created through case law. For example, hypothetical 
restrictions on11 or abuse of free movement rights,12 or situations all the elements of 
which are purely internal to one Member State,13 would not engage the application of 
the Treaty. Union citizenship did not14 (or did not initially15) unsettle the impact of 
                                                     
8 Articles 45(3) (workers), 52(1) (establishment) and 61 (services) TFEU; developed in Council 
Directive 64/221/EEC on the co-ordination of special measures concerning the movement and 
residence of foreign nationals which are justified on grounds of public policy, public security 
or public health (1964 OJ L56/850, repealed and replaced by Directive 2004/38). 
9 E.g. Case 36/75 Rutili, EU:C:1975:137, para. 27. 
10 Joined Cases C-482/01 and C-493/01 Orfanopoulos and Oliveri, EU:C:2004:262 para. 65 
(emphasis added). 
11 E.g. Case 180/83 Moser, [1984] ECR 2539, para. 18. 
12 E.g. Case C-370/90 Singh, EU:C:1992:296, para. 24. 
13 E.g. Case 115/78 Knoors, EU:C:1979:31, para. 24 
14 E.g. Case C-299/95 Kremzow, EU:C:1997:254, para. 16 (hypothetical restrictions).  
15 E.g. Joined Cases C-64/96 and C-65/96 Uecker and Jacquet, EU:C:1997:285, para. 23 (internal 
situations). 
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these ‘exclusionary rules’,16 with the exception of the piercing of the purely internal 
barrier in situations where national measures deprive individuals of the genuine 
enjoyment of the substance of rights conferred by Union citizenship.17 
Finally, two discrete legislative conditions come from pre-citizenship 
directives that conferred free movement rights for purposes other than economic 
activity, requiring a mobile Member State national to have (covering his/her family 
members where relevant): (1) sickness insurance in respect of all risks in the host 
State, and (2) sufficient resources not to become a burden on its social assistance 
system.18 The sufficient resources requirement, in particular, has left an enduring 
imprint on citizenship law. It was not imposed on the economically active,19 but 
those claiming residence rights in a host State to find employment – i.e. jobseekers – 
had to satisfy bespoke tests established in case law: that they (1) were actively 
looking for work, and (2) had a genuine chance of being engaged.20  
 
2.1. Conditions and limits post-citizenship 
 
Early statements on the nature of Union citizenship isolated a new dimension of free 
movement rights at the level of primary law, loosened from the requirement of 
economic activity21 and reflecting a surge in expectations of equal treatment.22 The 
framework that the Court developed for reviewing the compatibility of conditions 
and limits with the rights articulated in that context is traced here in three stages: 
first, case law on the 1990s Directives that came after the creation of citizenship; 
                                                     
16 Horsley, ‘Unearthing buried treasure: Article 34 TFEU and the exclusionary rules’ (2012) 
37:6 ELRev 734. 
17 Case C-34/09 Ruiz Zambrano, EU:C:2011:124 (forced departure from the territory of the 
Union; Case C-135/08 Rottmann, EU:C:2010:104 (loss of Member State nationality). 
18 Article 1 of Council Directive 90/364/EEC on the right of residence (1990 OJ L180/26); 
Article 1 of Council Directive 90/365/EEC on the right of residence for employees and self-
employed persons who have ceased their occupational activity (1990 OJ L180/28); and Article 
1 of Council Directive 93/96/EEC on the right of residence for students (1993 OJ L317/59) – 
though students were only required to make a declaration that the conditions were satisfied. 
19 Continuing the logic of e.g. Case 139/85 Kempf, EU:C:1986:223. 
20 Case C-292/89 Antonissen, EU:C:1991:80. 
21 E.g. Opinion of AG Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer in Case C-65/95 Shingara, EU:C:1996:451, para. 34; 
Opinion of AG Cosmas in Case C-378/97 Wijsenbeek, EU:C:1999:144, paras 83-85. 
22 E.g. Opinion of AG Jacobs in Case C-274/96 Bickel and Franz, EU:C:1998:115, paras 23-24. 
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second, the process of adopting Directive 2004/38; and, third, initial responses to the 
Directive in the case law. 
 
2.1.1.  Citizenship ‘versus’ conditions and limits: the formative case law 
Three judgments in particular produced the conventional framework for review of 
conditions and limits (Martínez Sala, Grzelczyk, and Baumbast), comprising five key 
elements: (1) conditions and limits expressly provided for23 will be assessed against (2) 
directly effective24 (3) primary rights,25 requiring (4) individual-centred assessments26 that 
respect the (5) general principles of EU law, especially equal treatment and 
proportionality.27 This template also reflects a legally significant distinction between 
the existence of primary rights – which could not be regulated by secondary law – 
and their exercise, which could.28 The wording of the Treaty was not ignored, and the 
legitimate function of secondary law was recognised. But the constitutional imprint 
of primary norms and of the wider system of EU law was also accommodated.  
A critical implication of this approach was that citizens tended to win their 
cases. The Court did acknowledge that conditions and limits reflect ‘the idea that the 
exercise of the right of residence…can be subordinated to the legitimate interests of 
the Member States’.29 In particular, it challenged States to confront the fact that it was 
within their discretion to expel citizens who became an unreasonable drain on 
resources.30 But the Court also ensured that such decisions were taken within the 
                                                     
23 Grzelczyk, n2 above, para. 31; reaffirmed in e.g. Case C-224/98 D’Hoop, EU:C:2002:432, para. 
28, Case C-148/02 Garcia Avello, EU:C:2003:539, para. 23, and Case C-200/02 Zhu and Chen, 
EU:C:2004:639, para. 30. See also, Opinion of AG Tizzano in Zhu and Chen, EU:C:2004:307, 
para. 74, characterising the Directive as a ‘measure which limits the exercise of a fundamental 
right…There is therefore no question of stretching its text so far as to incorporate in it a 
condition not expressly laid down’. 
24 Case C-413/99 Baumbast, EU:C:2002:493, paras 84-86.  
25 E.g. distinguishing free movement rights under Articles 21 and 45 TFEU, Case C-85/96 
Martínez Sala, EU:C:1998:217, paras 60-63; see similarly, Case C-456/02 Trojani EU:C:2004:488, 
para. 46. 
26 Grzelczyk, para. 44. 
27 Baumbast, para. 91. 
28 This reasoning stems from the Opinion of AG La Pergola in Martínez Sala, EU:C:1997:335, 
para. 18. 
29 Baumbast, para. 90. 
30 Based on the finite ‘certain degree of financial solidarity’ that nationals of the Member States 
were judged to share; see Grzelczyk, paras 42-44 (emphasis added).  
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protective requirements of EU law. And if States chose not to take that step, the 
principle of non-discrimination opened up their resources to Union citizens 
authorised to reside there, fuelling the transition of these citizens to new and better 
times. However, the attendant privileging of the libertarian aspirations of 
individuals, with little reflection on the systemic consequences for host State 
resources or societies, raised serious questions about forcing the reach of 
transnational solidarity. Indications that the beginning and end of conditions and 
limits might not sit exclusively in the express terms of legislation can also be found.31 
 
2.1.2. Directive 2004/38 
The process of drafting a new Directive provided the legislature with an opportunity 
to re-regulate free movement rights within the ‘new legal and political environment’ 
constituted by citizenship.32 Setting up the clusters of cases examined in Section 3, the 
discussion here tracks the enactment of three sets of conditions and limits: conditions 
attached to permanent residence; the reshaped framework on protection against 
expulsion; and the requirement to have sufficient resources. 
 It was originally proposed by the Commission that Union citizens could 
reside in other States without any formalities for up to six months;33 that they could 
acquire a right of permanent residence after four years (and lose it only after a period 
of absence exceeding four consecutive years); and that citizens (and family members) 
who had that right would gain absolute protection from expulsion.34 Responses from 
the other institutions required further conditions to be attached to permanent 
residence. In particular, the European Parliament proposed the condition of legal as 
well as continuous residence in a host State now enacted in Article 16(1) of the 
                                                     
31 E.g. Zhu and Chen, para. 20: ‘it does not follow either from the terms of, or from the aims 
pursued by, Articles 18 EC and 49 EC and Directives 73/148 and 90/364 that the enjoyment of 
the rights with which those provisions are concerned should be made conditional upon the 
attainment of a minimum age’ (emphasis added). 
32 Para. 1.3 of the Commission’s original proposal for the Directive (COM(2001) 257); see 
similarly, para. 1 of the amended proposal (COM(2003) 199 final). 
33 Later reduced to three months by the Council; see Statement of the Council’s Reasons in 
Common Position (EC) No 6/2004 of 5 December 2003 (2004 OJ C54E/12.  
34 COM(2001) 257, especially at paras 1.4, 2.2 and 2.3, and the ‘comments’ on draft Articles 14 
and 26 in the same document. 
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Directive. But neither the reasoning behind the amendment nor its intended meaning 
was explained.35  Additionally, the Council was ‘almost unanimously against the 
absolute protection against expulsion, although it has accepted an increased 
protection for Union citizens who have been residing for a long period in the host 
Member State’.36 On that basis, the incremental framework for protection against 
expulsion now outlined in Article 28 of the Directive was introduced. 
 It was plainly intended that economically inactive citizens would still be 
required to have sufficient resources and sickness insurance. The Commission 
reconciled the retention of these conditions with the facilitation and strengthening of 
rights intended by the Directive on the grounds that since ‘social assistance provision 
is not covered by [Union] law and is not, as a rule, “exportable”, complete equal 
treatment as regards social security benefits is not possible without running the risk 
of certain categories of people entitled to the right of residence, in particular those 
not engaged in gainful activity, becoming an undue burden on public funds in the 
host Member State’.37 The first draft of what became Article 7(1)(b)38 therefore sought 
to preserve the balance recognised in Baumbast between the fundamental nature of 
free movement rights and the legitimate interests of Member States. The concept of 
unreasonable burden emphasised in Grzelczyk was retained in the Directive’s 
                                                     
35 European Parliament report from 23 January 2003 on the proposal for a European 
Parliament and Council directive on the right of citizens of the Union and their family 
members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States, A5-0009/2003, 
Committee on Citizens’ Freedoms and Rights, Justice and Home Affairs, at 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+REPORT+A5-2003-
0009+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN. The Council changed the condition from four to five years for 
acquiring permanent residence, and to absence for two years regarding its loss; see C/03/259, 
Brussels, 22 September 2003, 12339/03 (Presse 259) 2525th Council meeting - Competitiveness 
- Internal market, industry and research, Brussels, 22 September 2003, at 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_PRES-03-259_en.htm?locale=en. 
36 Statement of the Council’s Reasons, n33 above. 
37 COM(2001) 257, comment on draft Article 7. Not everyone agreed, noting inter alia the 
constitutional implications of Union citizenship; see e.g. Opinion of the Committee on Legal 
Affairs and the Internal Market in the European Parliament report, n35 above. 
38 I.e. to ‘have sufficient resources for themselves and for their family members to avoid 
becoming a burden on the social assistance system of the host Member State during their stay 
and that they have sickness insurance covering all risks in the host Member State’. The 
adopted version reads: ‘not to become a burden on the social assistance system of the host 
Member State during their period of residence and have comprehensive sickness insurance 
cover in the host Member State’. 
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preamble 39  (and in Article 14(1) for residence rights up to three months), but 
‘unreasonable’ was detached from the ‘burden’ condition regulating residence for 
more than three months in Article 7(1)(b) – providing an example of internal tensions 
across different parts of the Directive, a point returned to in Section 3. 
It is interesting that the phrasing of the (adopted) German language version 
of the Directive is different, requiring that Union citizens should have sufficient 
resources ‘without recourse to welfare funds in the host Member State during their 
stay’. That formulation is stricter than the notion of burden and does not fit with the 
broader scheme of the Directive.40 But it is a more definitive test. It would be easier to 
apply in practice. It also aligns with the original draft of Article 24. The Commission 
acknowledged the ‘direct link between the principle of non-discrimination and the 
right of residence’ established in Martínez Sala, but recalled that ‘Article 7 clearly 
stipulates that people not working must have sufficient resources and sickness 
insurance, and by consequence having recourse to public funds may challenge his 
right of residence’.41 It therefore proposed the following text: 
 
(1) All EU citizens residing on the territory of the host Member State shall 
enjoy equal treatment with the nationals of that country within the scope of 
the Treaty. ... 
(2) By way of derogation from paragraph 1, until they have acquired the right of 
permanent residence, the host Member State shall not be obliged to confer entitlement 
to social assistance on persons other than those engaged in gainful activity in an 
employed or self-employed capacity or the members of their families, nor shall it 
be obliged to award maintenance grants to persons having the right of 
residence who have come to the country to study [emphasis added]. 
 
Draft paragraph (1) was a more open statement on equal treatment than Article 24(1) 
as adopted.42 The Council was responsible for the addition that equal treatment is 
                                                     
39 A fact of which the Member States were clearly aware: see Statement of the Council’s 
Reasons, n33 above, where the Council considers that its proposed text for recital 16 would 
provide a ‘useful indication for the criteria to follow in order to establish if a person has 
become an unreasonable burden’.  
40 Opinion of AG Wahl in Case C-140/12 Brey, EU:C:2013:337, paras 74-77, pointing to Articles 
8(4), 14(2) and Article 14(3), as well as recitals 10 and 16 of the preamble. 
41 COM(2001) 257, comment on draft Article 21. 
42 ‘Subject to such specific provisions as are expressly provided for in the Treaty and 
secondary law, all Union citizens residing on the basis of this Directive in the territory of the 
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‘[s]ubject to such specific provisions as are expressly provided for in the Treaty and 
secondary law’ – the slowly dawning potency of which unfolds in Section 3.1 below – 
but provided no comment on the motivation behind or intended scope of its late-
stage amendment.43 Draft paragraph (2) was a more generalised refuting of Martínez 
Sala and Grzelczyk – as the Commission explicitly noted in its revised proposal.44 In 
its Communication on the Council’s Common Position, the Commission indicated 
that the altered version of Article 24(2) ‘was designed to remove the provision that 
persons not engaged in gainful activity are not entitled to social assistance until they have 
acquired the right of permanent residence. The Council has accepted this amendment, 
but added that Union citizens may be refused entitlement to social assistance during 
the first three months of their stay’.45 Article 24(2) of Directive 2004/38 was not, 
therefore, intended to displace the fundamental nature of equal treatment applied in 
case law. In fact, the strictness of the original draft underscores the permissiveness of 
the adopted text – the derogations in which are narrowly targeted in scope, from 
temporal (no obligation to confer entitlement to social assistance for the first three 
months only) and material (limits for jobseekers and students only) perspectives. But 
this overview of the Directive’s drafting history reveals a measure striving to 
reconcile contrasting ambitions and preferences – and not altogether successfully. 
                                                                                                                                                        
host Member State shall enjoy equal treatment with the nationals of that Member State within 
the scope of the Treaty’. 
43  Statement of the Council’s Reasons, n33 above. Article 24(2) as adopted provides: ‘By way 
of derogation from paragraph 1, the host Member State shall not be obliged to confer 
entitlement to social assistance during the first three months of residence or, where 
appropriate, the longer period provided for in Article 14(4)(b), nor shall it be obliged, prior to 
acquisition of the right of permanent residence, to grant maintenance aid for studies, 
including vocational training, consisting in student grants or student loans to persons other 
than workers, self-employed persons, persons who retain such status and members of their 
families’. 
44 COM(2003) 199 final, explanatory memorandum: ‘the aim here is to eliminate exclusion 
from welfare assistance for persons not engaged in gainful activity before they acquire 
permanent right of residence. This restriction is not contained in the Directives concerning 
right of residence for those not in gainful activity. It could be interpreted as retrogressive in 
relation to the current acquis, notably in the light of the case-law of the Court of Justice’. 
45 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament concerning the common 
position of the Council on the adoption of a European Parliament and Council Directive on 
the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within 
the territory of the Member States, SEC/2003/1293 final – COD 2001/0111 (emphasis added). 
The amendments that shaped the adopted text came largely from the European Parliament’s 
report, n35 above. 
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2.1.3. Adapting to Directive 2004/38 in the case law 
A first testing of the more complicated legislative framework on conditions and 
limits came in Förster, where the Court accepted a five-year residence rule limiting 
entitlement to student maintenance.46 Directive 2004/38 was not applicable to the 
facts, but the Court acknowledged the specific reference to maintenance grants in 
Article 24(2) when assessing the proportionality of the national measure. However, 
Article 24(2) unambiguously limits entitlement to maintenance grants for students. 
The same cannot be said for social assistance generally. In that light, AG Mazák 
commented that the Directive ‘cannot detract from the requirements flowing from 
Article [18 TFEU] and the general principle of proportionality’.47 In other words, 
conditions and limits may affect but do not comprise the content of primary rights.  
The judgment in Metock, delivered four months previously, underscores the 
extent to which Förster was an isolated departure from the prevailing approach. In 
2003, the Court had ruled in Akrich that the third country national spouse of a Union 
citizen ‘must be lawfully resident in a Member State when he moves to another 
Member State to which the citizen of the Union is migrating or has migrated’ in 
order to benefit from derived residence rights under Article 10 of Regulation 
1612/68.48 However, the adoption of Directive 2004/38, the relevant provisions of 
which replaced Article 10 of the Regulation, required the decision in Akrich to be 
‘reconsidered’.49 Applying Grzelczyk, the Court stated in Metock that ‘no provision of 
Directive 2004/38 makes [its] application…conditional on…having previously 
resided in a Member State’.50 Addressing a different question – whether when or 
where a marriage took place was a relevant factor – the reasoning of the Court again 
reflects the conventional method developed before the adoption of the Directive i.e. 
its provisions should not be interpreted restrictively (para. 84); and conditions and 
                                                     
46 Case C-158/07 Förster, EU:C:2008:630, especially paras 52-58. See generally, S O’Leary, 
‘Equal treatment and EU citizens: A new chapter on cross-border educational mobility and 
access to student financial assistance’ (2009) 34:4 ELRev 612. 
47 Opinion of AG Mazák in Förster, EU:C:2008:399, para. 131. 
48 Case C-109/01 Akrich, EU:C:2003:491, para. 50. 
49 Case C-127/08 Metock, EU:C:2008:449, para. 58. 
50 Metock, para. 49; see also, paras 51 and 53. 
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limits have to be provided for to constitute legitimate restrictions on free movement 
rights (para. 87) because of the latter’s fundamental nature (para. 89).  
The Court was perfectly aware of the views of the Member States in Metock – 
ten of which in addition to Ireland (the Government directly involved) submitted 
observations presaging current debates: ‘in a context typified by strong pressure of 
migration, it is necessary to control immigration at the external borders of the [Union], 
which presupposes an individual examination of all the circumstances surrounding a 
first entry into Community territory’.51 The Court responded by pointing out that EU 
rights are not unlimited and States could engage the opportunities for migration 
control already built into the system of the Directive (noting e.g. Article 35 on 
preventing abuse of rights); and reminding the Member States that all of them are 
parties to the ECHR, Article 8 of which protects the right to respect for family life.52 
In its 2010 judgment in Lassal – addressing whether or not periods of 
residence in a host State before the coming into force of Directive 2004/38 could later 
count towards establishing permanent residence – the Court again prioritised the 
primary and individual nature of the right to move and reside (citing Baumbast); 
referred to the ‘reaffirmation’ of that interpretation in Article 45 of the Charter; and 
emphasised the rights-strengthening ‘in particular’ aim of the Directive (citing 
Metock).53 On the right of permanent residence specifically, referring to recital 17 of 
the Directive, the Court ruled that ‘the objectives and purpose of [permanent 
residence] to promote social cohesion and to strengthen the feeling of Union 
citizenship, would be seriously compromised if that right of residence was refused to 
citizens of the European Union who had legally resided in the host Member State for 
a continuous period of five years completed before 30 April 2006, on the sole ground 
that there had been temporary absence of less than two consecutive years subsequent 
to that period but before that same date’.54 A gap in the Directive was thereby filled 
with established principles affirming the fundamental nature of free movement 
rights, since the main purpose of the Directive was to facilitate and strengthen them.  
                                                     
51 Metock, para. 71 (emphasis added). 
52 Metock, paras 73-79. 
53 Case C-162/09 Lassal, EU:C:2010:592, paras 29-31. 
54 Lassal, para. 53. 
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2.2. A note on duties 
 
The duty dimension of citizenship has a very different history to the denser 
framework on conditions and limits outlined above. Article 20(2) TFEU provides that 
Union citizens ‘shall enjoy the rights and be subject to the duties provided for in the 
Treaties’. But it has never been clear – even with a basic consensus in the literature 
that duties are or should be an important element of citizenship rights generally55 – 
what these duties actually are. Additionally, while the Treaty confers competence on 
the legislature in the field of citizenship, it is to facilitate the exercise of the right to 
move and reside (Article 21(2) TFEU) or to ‘strengthen or to add to the rights listed in 
Article 20(2)’ (Article 25 TFEU). While unwritten citizenship rights have emerged 
through case law,56 the relative state of inertia on the uncovering of unwritten duties 
is the probable impetus behind Kochenov’s challenging assertion that ‘duties of EU 
citizenship only exist as one word in the Treaty, which does not happen to 
correspond to anything in either contemporary legal theory or in practice’.57  
Kochenov’s thesis has both normative and empirical dimensions, and his 
normative concerns go beyond the make-up of Union citizenship only.58 However, 
addressing his claim on the role of duties in practice, a distinction could perhaps be 
drawn between formal duties ‘provided for in the Treaties’ – of which there has 
indeed been virtually no discussion or development in Union citizenship law – and 
implied duties i.e. what emerges when we reverse expressions of conditions or limits 
as instances of obligation or responsibility: for example, the condition to have 
sufficient resources expressed instead as an obligation or responsibility to have them. 
                                                     
55 E.g. Shaw ‘Citizenship of the Union: towards post-national membership’, Jean Monnet 
Working Paper 6/97, at http://www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/archive/papers/97/97-06-.html; 
Weiler, ‘To be a European citizen: Eros and civilization’ in Weiler, The Constitution of Europe: 
‘Do the New Clothes Have an Emperor?’ and Other Essays on European Integration (Cambridge 
University Press, 1999); Davis, ‘Citizenship of the Union … rights for all?’ (2002) 27:1 ELRev 
121; Besson and Utzinger ‘Introduction: future challenges of European citizenship—facing a 
wide-open Pandora’s box’ (2007) 13:5 ELJ 573; and Kostakopoulou, ‘European citizenship 
rights and duties: civil, political and social’, Warwick School of Law, Legal Studies Paper No 
2013/25, at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2316819.  
56 Notably, the right not to be forced from the territory of the Union in Ruiz Zambrano. 
57 Kochenov, ‘EU citizenship without duties’ (2014) 20:4 ELJ 482 at 483, and 485. 
58 Cf. Bellamy, ‘A duty free Europe? What’s wrong with Kochenov’s account of EU 
citizenship rights’ (2015) 21 ELJ (forthcoming). 
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This shift in discourse and its implications for the interpretation of citizenship is 
evident in citizenship law more recently. For present purposes, however, these 
implied duties can be treated as a variant of conditions and limits in functional terms. 
Kochenov also espouses an important premise of legitimate duties: ‘[i]t is 
crucial to see which duties are set out in the law in order to understand the role they 
play in the legal system’.59 But the ascension of implied citizenship duties in EU law 
has tended to occur, as will be shown in Section 3, without adherence to what is 
provided for, even in secondary law. Kochenov adds another cautionary note with his 
remark that ‘the main function of citizenship duties in the past was an exclusionary 
one: duties were relied upon to outline second-class citizens...in order to justify their 
full exclusion from the actual benefits that the legal status of citizenship which they 
formally possessed was supposed to provide to “everyone”.’ 60  Arguably, this 
exclusionary inclination of duties, which re-institutes the borders of the State and 
entrenches the pull of nationality, remains a feature of contemporary Union 
citizenship more than anyone thought it still would.   
 
3. Mutation: the changing legal shape of citizenship 
 
In March 2011, building on the injection of EU law into national decisions on the 
withdrawal of Member State nationality in Rottmann, the ruling in Ruiz Zambrano 
engaged citizenship rights in a situation purely internal to one State. However, the 
qualification that Ruiz Zambrano rights apply only in ‘exceptional circumstances’61 
quickly followed.62 The fact that several States have more circumspect expectations of 
citizenship was obvious from submissions to the Court over many years. But rulings 
like Metock demonstrate that such views were not a decisive influence on the 
direction of the case law – accentuating all the more both the fact that and the speed 
                                                     
59 Kochenov, n57 above, 485 (emphasis added). 
60 Ibid 489-490 (emphasis added). 
61 Case C-256/11 Dereci, EU:C:2011:734, para. 55. 
62 E.g. Case C-434/09 McCarthy, EU:C:2011:277; Dereci; Case C40/11 Iida, EU:C:2012:691; Joined 
Cases C-356/11 and C-357/11 O and S, EU:C:2012:776; and Case C-86/12 Alokpa, EU:C:2013:645. 
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with which the Court exceeded the referring court’s questions in McCarthy 63  to 
contain the implications of the Ruiz Zambrano judgment just two months earlier – 
especially since translation logistics would suggest that the qualification included in 
the McCarthy judgment must have been a very late-stage addition to its text.  
Judgments are constructed through the making of deliberate choices,64 which 
then set up the success or failure of the citizen’s claim as well the context in which 
we contemplate the rightness of the decision. Case law trends also ebb and flow – 
expansive decisions follow restrictive decisions; and vice versa. However, it is 
argued here that McCarthy exhibits the beginnings of a more wide-scale and 
sustained recent shift from predominantly rights-opening to predominantly rights-
curbing assessments of citizenship rights. The intensity of academic but also political 
reaction to Ruiz Zambrano is an important factor internal to citizenship law when 
thinking about motivations that may have produced this shift.65 The persistence of 
the Eurozone crisis and disillusionment with the austerity strategy applied in 
response sharpen external questions about the legitimate locus of control over public 
spending. Notably, States worked outside the boundaries of the existing Treaties to 
advance their preferred plan of action – diluting the supervisory capacity of the EU 
institutions. Withdrawal from the Union altogether has become a serious prospect 
for the UK, a central plank of which concerns perceived abuse of free movement. The 
sum of these wider contextual parts could well have induced the systemic spasm that 
has profoundly altered the legal trajectory of citizenship.66  
                                                     
63 ‘[E]ven though, formally, the national court has limited its questions to the interpretation of 
Articles 3(1) and 16 of Directive 2004/38, such a situation does not prevent the Court from 
providing the national court with all the elements of interpretation of European Union law 
which may be of assistance in adjudicating on the case before it, whether or not that court has 
specifically referred to them in the question’ (McCarthy, para. 24). 
64 See generally, S ̌adl, ‘Case – case-law – law: Ruiz Zambrano as an illustration of how the 
Court of Justice of the European Union constructs its legal arguments’ (2013) 9:2 EuConst 205. 
65 E.g. Hailbronner and Thym, comment on Ruiz Zambrano (2011) 48:4 CMLRev 1253; 
Kochenov, ‘EU citizenship: from an incipient form to an incipient substance? (2012) 37:3 
ELRev 369; van Eijken and de Vries, ‘A new route into the Promised Land? Being a European 
citizen after Ruiz Zambrano’ (2011) 36:5 ELRev 704; Wollenschläger, ‘A new fundamental 
freedom beyond market integration: Union citizenship and its dynamics for shifting the 
economic paradigm of European integration’, (2011) 17:1 ELJ 34. 
66 See Amtenbrink, ‘Europe in times of economic crisis: Bringing Europe’s citizens closer to 
one another?’ in Dougan, Nic Shuibhne, and Spaventa (eds.), Empowerment and 
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This generational case law shift is, of course, partly connected simply to the 
coming into force of the Directive, and to related analyses of the roles of the 
legislature and the judiciary respectively.67  But it is not adequately captured or 
explained by it. More cases on Directive 2004/38 naturally reached the Court over 
time, presenting it with further opportunities to bring out the nuances of the measure 
– including the restrictive provisions. But the Directive was not the game-changer. 
Several points support this claim, in turn supporting the argument that the reasons 
for change lie also in the wider context outlined above. First, both Ruiz Zambrano and 
the cases that limited its impact soon afterwards were about Treaty rights and not 
legislative provisions. Second, the cardinal condition of sufficient resources pre-
exists the Directive. Third, the ‘new legal and political environment’ that shaped the 
adoption of Directive 2004/38 was initially reflected through emphasising its 
objective of facilitating and strengthening free movement rights. In McCarthy, 
however, the Court framed the purpose of the measure very differently:  
 
[W]hilst it is true that…Directive 2004/38 aims to facilitate and strengthen the 
exercise of the primary and individual right to move and reside freely within 
the territory of the Member States that is conferred directly on each citizen of 
the Union, the fact remains that the subject of the directive concerns, as is 
apparent from Article 1(a), the conditions governing the exercise of that right.68  
 
Finally, it will be shown that the methods applied in recent case law are not confined 
to application of the Directive (Section 3.1 on access to social assistance). There is also 
                                                                                                                                                        
Disempowerment of the European Citizen (Hart Publishing, 2012) 171; Azoulai, 
‘The(mis)construction of the European individual – two essays on Union citizenship law’, 
EUI working papers, LAW 2014/14, at 
http://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/33293/LAW_WP_%202014_14.pdf?sequence=1, 2-
3 and 17; Kostakopoulou, ‘When EU citizens become foreigners’ (2014) 20:4 ELJ 447 at 458; 
Thym, n4 supra, 20-21; and Spaventa, ‘Earned citizenship – understanding Union citizenship 
through its scope’ in Kochenov (ed.) Citizenship and Federalism in Europe: The Role of Rights, 
(CUP, forthcoming 2015). 
67 See further, Hailbronner, ’Union citizenship and access to social benefits’ (2005) 42:5 
CMLRev 1245; Dougan, ‘Judicial activism or constitutional interaction? Policymaking by the 
ECJ in the field of Union citizenship’ in Micklitz and de Witte (eds.), The European Court of 
Justice and the Autonomy of the Member States (Intersentia, 2012) 113. 
68 McCarthy, n62 above, para. 33 (emphasis added); repeated in e.g. Case C-456/12 O, 
EU:C:2014:135, para. 41; see further, the discussion on Brey in Section 3.1.1. 
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inflation of conditions and limits (Section 3.2 on permanent residence) and even 
disruption of the intention of the legislature (Section 3.3 on expulsion).  
 
3.1. Application: equal treatment and access to social assistance 
 
We saw in Section 2.1.2 that the legislature rejected a harder but cleaner approach to 
social assistance when adopting Directive 2004/38: for the first five years of residence, 
draft Article 24(2) ruled out entitlement through EU law for mobile citizens ‘other 
than those engaged in gainful activity in an employed or self-employed capacity’ in a 
host State. In the end, the limiting of such entitlement was linked to the first three 
months of residence, with further restrictions addressing jobseekers and 
maintenance aid for students only. But it was also noted that the scheme of the 
Directive transmits mixed messages69 – the requirement that mobile citizens should 
have sufficient resources alongside the implication that reasonable burdens on host 
State resources are tolerated; or the option of expelling citizens not meeting the 
conditions in Article 7(1) while providing that such decisions must not be an 
automatic consequence of recourse to social assistance. Overall, neither the nature nor 
extent of host State obligations is clearly delineated in the Directive.70 Four particular 
complications can be noted for present purposes. First, as shown in Section 2.1.2, the 
Commission did not consider that the Directive usurped how equal treatment was 
managed as a primary right in the formative case law. In particular, Union citizens 
authorised to reside in a host State should therefore remain entitled to the same social 
assistance provision as nationals of that State. 71  Second, no provisions of the 
Directive appeared to preclude the individual-centred assessments required by 
                                                     
69 In Thym’s view, ‘the EU legislature had opted for deliberate ambiguity when drafting the 
free movement rules’ (n4 above, 26). 
70 See generally, Menéndez, ‘European citizenship after Martínez Sala and Baumbast: has 
European law become more human but less social?’ ARENA Working Paper 11/2009, at 
http://www.sv.uio.no/arena/english/research/publications/arena-
publications/workingpapers/working-papers2009/WP11_09_Online.pdf; Oršolić Dalessio, 
‘The social dimension of EU citizenship – a castle in the air or construction gone wrong?’ 
(2013) 14:7 German Law Journal 869; and de Witte, ‘Transnational solidarity and the mediation 
of conflicts of justice in Europe’ (2012) 18:5 ELJ 694. 
71 On this point, see AG Geelhoed in Bidar, EU:C:2004:715, para. 32. 
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proportionality. Third, while ‘real link’ methods developed to determine eligibility 
for student maintenance aid in Bidar were superseded by the wording of Article 
24(2),72 they still apply in other circumstances and especially when evaluating the 
proportionality of restrictions placed on exporting benefits.73  
Fourth, a discrete version of the real link test was developed for jobseekers. In 
Collins, the Court ruled that ‘[i]n view of the establishment of citizenship…it is no 
longer possible to exclude from the scope of Article [45 TFEU] – which expresses the 
fundamental principle of equal treatment, guaranteed by Article [18] of the Treaty – a 
benefit of a financial nature intended to facilitate access to employment in the labour 
market of a Member State’. 74  However, it was legitimate for States to limit 
entitlement to situations where ‘a genuine link exists between the person seeking 
work and the employment market of that State’ by the application of a 
(proportionate) residence test.75 In Vatsouras and Koupatanze, the Court was asked 
whether the preclusion of entitlement to social assistance for jobseekers in Article 
24(2) of the Directive called the constitutionality of that provision into question vis-à-
vis rights conferred by Articles 18 and 45 TFEU. The Court avoided substantive 
discussion of the problem by stating without further explanation that ‘[b]enefits of a 
financial nature which…are intended to facilitate access to the labour market cannot 
be regarded as constituting “social assistance” within the meaning of Article 24(2)’.76 
That response further underpins the argument that Directive 2004/38 was not the 
definitive game-changer since, ironically, jobseekers are one of the few categories of 
citizen explicitly excluded from entitlement to social assistance by its provisions.  
 
3.1.1. Continuity: Brey  
The framework emerging from the points summarised above was – building on the 
Martínez Sala/Grzelczyk/Baumbast template – extra-Directive. Crucially, however, the 
                                                     
72 Case C-209/03 Bidar, EU:C:2005:169, especially paras 56-59. 
73 E.g. Joined Cases C‑11/06 and C‑12/06 Morgan and Bucher, EU:C:2007:626; Case C-192/05 
Case C-499/06 Nerkowska, EU:C:2008:300; Case C-220/12 Thiele Meneses, EU:C:2013:683; Case 
C-359/13 Martens, EU:C:2015:118. 
74 Case C-138/02 Collins, EU:C:2004:172, para. 63. In his Opinion, AG Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer 
linked legitimate residence conditions to curbing benefit tourism (EU:C:2003:409, para. 75). 
75 Collins, para. 69. 
76 Joined Cases C-22/08 and C-23/08 Vatsouras and Koupatantze, EU:C:2009:344, para. 45. 
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Court’s tendency to take this broader approach initially persisted, as demonstrated 
by the 2013 judgment in Brey. A first concern was whether the supplementary 
allowance applied for in this case was a special non-contributory benefit under 
Regulation 883/2004.77 The Court ruled that even where a benefit falls within the 
scope of the Regulation (as the allowance here did), the concept of ‘social assistance’ 
governing entitlement to benefits – i.e. linked to the condition in Article 7(1)(b) of the 
Directive that an economically inactive citizen should not become a burden on the 
host State social assistance system – is autonomous. For that purpose, the Court 
defined it as ‘all assistance introduced by the public authorities, whether at national, 
regional or local level, that can be claimed by an individual who does not have 
resources sufficient to meet his own basic needs and the needs of his family and who, 
by reason of that fact, may become a burden on the public finances of the host 
Member State during his period of residence which could have consequences for the 
overall level of assistance which may be granted’.78 It emphasised that the Regulation 
and the Directive pursued different objectives, and repeated its narrowed McCarthy 
framing of the latter.79 It also affirmed that ‘the exercise of the right of residence for 
citizens of the Union can be subordinated to the legitimate interests of the Member 
States – in the present case, the protection of their public finances’.80 
However, while it was stated that the Directive ‘allows the host Member State 
to impose legitimate restrictions in connection with the grant of such benefits to 
Union citizens who do not or no longer have worker status’,81 the Court also invoked 
the protective requirements of the formative case law. In particular, recourse to social 
assistance may indicate the absence of sufficient resources, but ‘competent national 
authorities cannot draw such conclusions without first carrying out an overall 
assessment of the specific burden which granting that benefit would place on the 
national social assistance system as a whole, by reference to the personal circumstances 
characterising the individual situation of the person concerned’.82 The Court drew lines 
                                                     
77 Regulation 883/2004/EC on the coordination of social security systems, 2004 OJ L166/1. 
78 Brey, EU:C:2013:565, para. 61.  
79 Brey, para. 53. 
80 Brey, para. 55; confirming e.g. Zhu and Chen, n23 above, para. 33. 
81 Brey, para. 57 (emphasis added). 
82 Brey, para. 64 (emphasis added); see further, paras 67-68. 
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directly back to Grzelczyk (‘there is nothing in Directive 2004/38 to preclude nationals 
of other Member States from receiving social security benefits in the host Member 
State’83) and Baumbast (‘since the right to freedom of movement is – as a fundamental 
principle of EU law – the general rule, the conditions laid down in Article 
7(1)(b)…must be construed narrowly…and in compliance with the limits imposed by 
EU law and the principle of proportionality’84). Pulling away from the McCarthy 
framing statement, the Court here noted – reflecting Metock – that ‘the margin for 
manoeuvre which the Member States are recognised as having must not be used by 
them in a manner which would compromise attainment of the objective of Directive 
2004/38, which is, inter alia, to facilitate and strengthen the exercise of Union citizens’ 
primary right to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States’.85  
The final concerns of the Court are worth extracting at length, since they 
contrast sharply with the resolution of the Dano case by the Grand Chamber in 2014: 
[I]it is clear from the explanation provided by the Austrian Government at 
the hearing that…the mere fact that a national of another Member State who 
is not economically active has applied for that benefit is sufficient to preclude 
that national from receiving it, regardless of the duration of residence, the 
amount of the benefit and the period for which it is available, that is to say, 
regardless of the burden which that benefit places on the host Member State’s 
social assistance system as a whole. Such a mechanism, whereby nationals of 
other Member States who are not economically active are automatically barred by the 
host Member State from receiving a particular social security benefit, even for the 
period following the first three months of residence referred to in Article 
24(2)…does not enable the competent authorities of the host Member 
State…to carry out – in accordance with the requirements under, inter alia, Articles 
7(1)(b) and 8(4) of that directive and the principle of proportionality – an overall 
assessment of the specific burden which granting that benefit would place on 
the social assistance system as a whole by reference to the personal 
circumstances characterising the individual situation of the person 
concerned.86 
 
It is difficult to grasp in practical terms how national authorities could actually 
measure the ‘specific burden [that] granting the benefit would place on the social 
                                                     
83 Brey, para. 65. In contrast, AG Wahl applied a real link case law, ‘leav[ing] Mr Brey without 
the compensatory supplement’; see paras 88-89 of the Opinion. 
84 Brey, para. 70. 
85 Brey, para. 71 (emphasis added). 
86 Brey, paras 76-77 (emphasis added). 
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assistance system as a whole’, though the Court did note the Commission’s suggestion 
‘to determine the proportion of the beneficiaries of that benefit who are Union 
citizens in receipt of a retirement pension in another Member State’.87 The more 
extractable prescription concerns the factors that national authorities should take into 
account when assessing individual situations i.e. ‘the amount and the regularity of 
the income which he receives; the fact that those factors have led those authorities to 
issue him with a certificate of residence; and the period during which the benefit 
applied for is likely to be granted to him’. 88  The appraisal of the specific 
circumstances of the applicant was therefore left to the referring court.  
 
3.1.2. Departure: Dano 
The judgment in Brey aimed to reconcile the primary rights of Union citizens with 
rising concern about control over public finances and a perception in some States 
that governments face increasing abuse of EU rights yet lack the power to deal with 
it. Interestingly, the Court grounded individual-centred assessments in Article 
7(1)(b) of the Directive as well as in the principle of proportionality. But the efforts of 
the Third Chamber did not endure. The facts and context of Dano have been covered 
in detail in previous contributions to the Review.89 The Court summarised the key 
questions referred as asking ‘whether Article 18 TFEU, Article 20(2) TFEU, Article 
24(2) of Directive 2004/38 and Article 4 of Regulation No 883/2004 must be 
interpreted as precluding legislation of a Member State under which nationals of 
other Member States who are not economically active are excluded, in full or in part, 
from entitlement to certain “special non-contributory cash benefits”…although those 
benefits are granted to nationals of the Member State concerned who are in the same 
situation’.90 It repeated the definition of social assistance developed in Brey; recalled 
the fundamental status of Union citizenship and the prohibition in EU law on 
unjustified nationality discrimination; and observed that free movement rights are 
                                                     
87 Brey, para. 78. 
88 Ibid. 
89 See Thym, n4 above; and Verschueren, ‘Preventing “benefit tourism” in the EU: a narrow or 
broad interpretation of the possibilities offered by the ECJ in Dano?’ (2015) 52:2 CMLRev 363. 
90 Dano, n6 above, para. 56. 
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conferred subject to compliance with the limitations and conditions laid down in the 
Treaties and in secondary law.91 Four facets of the analysis that then followed are 
assessed here: Article 24(1) as a limit on equal treatment; abuse of free movement 
rights; the shift from individual-centred assessments to generalised exclusion; and 
the relevance of the Charter. 
The first issue concerns equal treatment. Although Ms Dano had been issued 
with residence ‘certificates’ in Germany – a point returned to in Section 4.2 – there 
was no discussion in the judgment of whether she was lawfully resident under 
national law, activating equal treatment rights under Martínez Sala, Grzelczyk and 
Trojani.92 Instead, the Court concentrated exclusively on Directive 2004/38. First, it 
stated that ‘the principle of non-discrimination, laid down generally in Article 18 
TFEU, is given more specific expression in Article 24 of Directive 2004/38…Accordingly, 
the Court should interpret Article 24’.93 However, since Ms Dano’s situation did not 
match any of the limits permitted by Article 24(2) – she had resided in Germany for 
more than three months, did not enter Germany to look for work, and was not 
currently looking for work – the Court considered instead, in a novel second step, 
whether Article 24(1) precluded ‘refusal to grant social benefits in a situation such as 
that at issue’.94 The Court thereby poured the content of the primary right to equal 
treatment into a statement in secondary law. That method turns the standard 
approach to conditions and limits on its constitutional head – the latter no longer 
temper equal treatment rights; they constitute the rights.95  
The standard view of Article 24 before Dano was that ‘[s]ince Article 24(2) is a 
derogation from the principle of equal treatment provided for in Article 18 TFEU, of 
which Article 24(1) of Directive 2004/38 is merely a specific expression, it must be 
                                                     
91 Dano, paras 58-60. 
92 Case law implicitly confirmed the previous year in Case C-45/12 Hadj Ahmed, EU:C:2013:390, 
paras 40-41. 
93 Dano, paras 61-62 (emphasis added). 
94 Dano, para. 67. 
95 See similarly, on the Alokpa case, Spaventa, n66 above: ‘The Directive…becomes floor and 
ceiling of rights – it is the standard; those oscillations that characterised the constituent phase 
of the case law, with its focus on the individual, are no longer there’ (emphasis in original). 
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interpreted narrowly’. 96 It is fair criticism in many respects that ‘judicial 
interpretation of particular Treaty articles pays insufficient attention to internal limits 
expressed therein and thereby gives inadequate attention to important Member State 
values/concerns’.97 But as O’Leary astutely observed, ‘[t]he difficulty with Article 
24(2) of the Directive is that the legislature acted after the Articles 18 and 21 TFEU 
horse had already bolted’.98 So what happens to the substance of rights developed 
judicially at Treaty level – endowing primary rights with a legal significance apart 
from secondary law – when the judiciary later retracts these rights through 
prioritising different or altered objectives? Where does primary-ness then go?  
Phrased differently from the conditions/limits phrasing of Article 21 TFEU, 
the prohibition on discrimination in Article 18 TFEU applies ‘[w]ithin the scope of 
application of the Treaties and without prejudice to any special provisions contained 
therein’ – denoting the validity of e.g. Article 45(3) and 45(4) TFEU, which articulate 
permissible limits on the equal treatment of workers. Article 18 TFEU is silent on its 
potential limitation by secondary law. One possibility is that such capacity could be 
imputed back to Article 18 indirectly by way of Article 21 TFEU as a ‘special 
provision’ in the Treaty.99 But even if that is correct, it has long been recognised that 
‘the prohibition of discrimination laid down in [Article 18 TFEU] is merely a specific 
enunciation of the general principle of equality which is one of the fundamental 
principles of [Union] law’.100 The Court has also determined that ‘[f]undamental 
rights include the general principle of equality and non-discrimination [precluding] 
comparable situations from being treated in a different manner unless the difference 
in treatment is objectively justified’. 101  Proportionality analysis is then applied 
precisely to ensure that differences in treatment are objectively justified. The 
                                                     
96 Opinion of AG Kokott in Case C-75/11 Commission v Austria, EU:C:2012:536, para. 80 
(emphasis added). 
97 Craig, ‘The ECJ and ultra vires action: a conceptual analysis’ (2011) 48:2 CMLRev 395 at 412. 
98 O’Leary, ‘The curious case of frontier workers and study finance: Giersch’ in (2014) 51:3 
CMLRev 601 at 617. 
99 See Hailbronner, n67 above, 1248-49. 
100 Joined Cases 117/76 and 16/77 Ruckdeschel, EU:C:1977:160, para. 7. 
101 Case C-442/00 Rodríguez Caballero, EU:C:2002:752, para. 32. Equal treatment as a general 
principle has been used in other strands of citizenship case law; see e.g. Case C-391/09 
Runevič-Vardyn and Wardyn EU:C:2011:291, para. 43. 
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acknowledged burden of undertaking an analysis of individual cases is then a 
consequence of having deployed the status of citizenship in the first place. 102 
Moreover, the Court has emphasised that ‘all [Union] acts must be interpreted in 
accordance with primary law as a whole, including the principle of equal treatment’.103 
The judgment in Dano never pauses to engage with – or distinguish – these 
established premises of EU law. It never reconciles the subsuming of equal treatment 
into secondary law with the conventional paradigm on conditions and limits. It 
simply ignores it. Article 24(1) of the Directive, unlike Article 18 TFEU, does refer to 
conditions and limits established in secondary law as well as in the Treaty – the 
amendment added by the Council and the power of which was arguably overlooked. 
It is now clear that those words transform the apparent expression of a right into a 
wider derogation than Article 24(2) was ever intended or able to achieve. By assenting 
without comment to this legislative version of primary law, the Court rescinds its 
duty of scrutiny over secondary law in two ways: it declines to review the legitimacy 
of legislative limits vis-à-vis the Treaty and wider principles at both a general level 
and in the individual case.104 But while Article 21 TFEU shelters the conditions and 
limits in Directive 2004/38 on one view, it also brings that measure up to 
constitutional level, which should in turn attract constitutional-level review.105  
Instead, by condensing the entire legal framework downwards to secondary 
law, it was not difficult for the Court to conclude that ‘a Union citizen can claim 
equal treatment with nationals of the host Member State only if his residence in the 
territory of the host Member State complies with the conditions of Directive 
2004/38’.106 Since Ms Dano was not economically active and did not (according to the 
                                                     
102 For a different view, see Hailbronner, n67 above, 1251-54. 
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106 Dano, para. 69. On this point, Thym argues that the Grand Chamber ‘effectively reversed 
the objective of Directive 2004/38’ (n4 above, 25), characterizing the finding as a ‘noteworthy 
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referring court) have sufficient resources for herself and her son107 – a point returned 
to below – she did not satisfy the conditions of Article 7(1) and was not therefore 
entitled to social assistance on the same basis as nationals of the host State.108 The 
Court considered that to find otherwise would ‘run counter to an objective of the 
directive, set out in recital 10 in its preamble, namely preventing Union citizens who 
are nationals of other Member States from becoming an unreasonable burden on the 
social assistance system of the host Member State’.109  
That statement bridges to the second issue: preventing abuse of free movement 
rights. The Court ruled that since ‘Article 7(1)(b)…seeks to prevent economically 
inactive Union citizens from using the host Member State’s welfare system to fund 
their means of subsistence…[a] Member State must therefore have the possibility…of 
refusing to grant social benefits to economically inactive Union citizens who exercise 
their right to freedom of movement solely in order to obtain another Member State’s 
social assistance although they do not have sufficient resources to claim a right of 
residence’.110 Generally, the motivation of the mobile citizen is not relevant, even 
where situations are constructed purely to acquire EU rights.111 However, intention is 
a factor when it concerns the (required) subjective element of establishing an abuse 
of rights i.e. ‘the intention to obtain an advantage from the EU rules by artificially 
creating the conditions laid down for obtaining it’.112  
In Dano, the Court did not expressly identify any ‘artificiality’ dimension in 
the applicant’s circumstances. There was also no clear statement that she came to 
Germany solely to obtain social assistance there: to impute this from the fact that ‘she 
is not seeking employment and…did not enter Germany in order to work’ (para. 66) 
is at least questionable in light of the gap in time between her presence in Germany 
                                                                                                                                                        
shift of emphasis, which accentuates Member State interests, while side-lining countervailing 
constitutional arguments that could have justified a different outcome’. 
107 Dano, para. 81. 
108 Dano, paras 70-73. 
109 Dano, para. 74. 
110 Dano, paras 76 and 78 (emphasis added). 
111 E.g. on Article 45 TFEU, Akrich, n48 above, paras 55-57 and Case C-46/12 N, EU:C:2013:97, 
para. 47; on Directive 2004/38 generally, Metock, n49 above, para. 75 and Case C-202/13 
McCarthy II, EU:C:2014:2450, paras 45-56. 
112 McCarthy II, para. 54 (emphasis added).  
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(noting that her son was born there in 2009) and her first application for basic 
provision (which was rejected in 2011). Moreover, a Union citizen can reside in a host 
State for up to three months under no conditions at all. When does the Dano clock 
actually start ticking, meaning that citizens can be asked about their motivation(s) for 
exercising free movement rights? In any event, the approval in Dano of national 
legislation excluding entitlement to social assistance for categories of citizens – contra 
Brey – as a means to address possible abuses of rights removes the option of assessing 
or even asking the relevant questions in individual cases in the first place. 
Confusingly, just one month later, we see a fundamentally different (yet more 
standard) approach to abuse of rights in McCarthy II – another Grand Chamber case 
though sharing a minority of (six) judges with the composition for Dano. The context 
of McCarthy II was different: whether States can require third-country national 
family members holding a residence card from another State under Article 10 of the 
Directive also to have an entry permit pursuant to their national law. More 
particularly, it was queried whether that requirement might be permitted by Article 
35 of Directive 2004/38, which provides that States ‘may adopt the necessary 
measures to refuse, terminate or withdraw any right conferred by this Directive in 
the case of abuse of rights or fraud, such as marriages of convenience’. While Article 
35 was not invoked explicitly in Dano, the Court considered there that ‘Article 
7(1)(b)…seeks to prevent economically inactive Union citizens from using the host 
Member State’s welfare system to fund their means of subsistence’.113 Authority for 
States to adopt legislation precluding access to benefits in such cases was then pulled 
from that rationale. However, in McCarthy II, the need to assess the individual 
position of each person affected was paramount once again. In particular, the Court 
held that States are ‘required to recognise such a residence card for the purposes of 
entry into their territory without a visa, unless doubt is cast on the authenticity of 
that card and the correctness of the data appearing on it by concrete evidence that 
                                                     
113 Dano, para. 76. 
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relates to the individual case in question and justifies the conclusion that there is an 
abuse of rights or fraud’.114 It continued: 
 
[T]he fact that a Member State is faced…with a high number of cases of abuse 
of rights or fraud committed by third-country nationals resorting to sham 
marriages or using falsified residence cards cannot justify the adoption of a 
measure…founded on considerations of general prevention, to the exclusion of any 
specific assessment of the conduct of the person concerned himself…Such measures, 
being automatic in nature, would allow Member States to leave the 
provisions of Directive 2004/38 unapplied and would disregard the very 
substance of the primary and individual right of Union citizens to move and 
reside freely … 115 
 
It is notable to see primary rights being used to interpret the provisions and scheme 
of the Directive (again) here – not the other way around. 
Linking to the third issue, through the confirmation in Dano that States may 
enact legislation to frustrate even the prospect of benefit tourism, the formerly central 
place of individual assessments is radically downgraded. A framework that requires case-
by-case assessments is far from perfect, especially from the perspectives of legal 
certainty and workability in practice.116 However, it does mediate the ambiguities 
built into the Directive. It places an obligation on national authorities at least to hear 
each claim. It encourages this not in the permission culture of standard immigration 
rules, but in the rights-based singularity of a transnational order rooted in 
citizenship.117 In contrast, generalised exclusion transgresses the framework of the 
formative case law, and sits oddly with the focus on the individual that shines 
thorugh more pervasively across the scheme of the Directive.118  
                                                     
114 McCarthy II, para. 53 (emphasis added); the Court also restated case law that requires both 
objective and subjective factors to establish abuse of rights (para. 54). 
115 McCarthy II, paras 55-57. 
116 See also, O’Leary, n98 above at 621-22. 
117 See generally, Shaw and Miller, ‘When legal worlds collide: an exploration of what 
happens when EU free movement law meets UK immigration law’ (2013) 38:1 ELRev 137. 
118 As well as Articles 27(2) and 28(1) (protection against expulsion), see also e.g. Articles 3(2) 
(beneficiaries), 5(4) (travel documents for third-country national family members), 8(4) (level 
of sufficient resources), and 14(4)(b) (retention of residence rights for jobseekers. On Article 
8(4) in particular, see Verschueren, n89 above at 383. 
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Strikingly, the several paragraphs in Brey prescribing the factors to be taken 
into account by national authorities were reduced to one line in Dano,119 with no 
reference to Brey here and no mention – anywhere – of the requirements of or even the 
word proportionality. But what is the implication of the stated fact that Ms Dano’s 
sister provides materially for her and for her son? Was Ms Dano’s inability to seek 
work connected to the need to care for her young son as a single parent? Was her 
situation temporary i.e. would recourse to benefits be of limited duration as her son 
became older? Whether the referring court considered these factors when it 
concluded on the insufficiency of her resources was never probed. Instead, the Court’s 
generalised summation – ‘that Article 24(1) of Directive 2004/38, read in conjunction 
with Article 7(1)(b)…must be interpreted as not precluding legislation’120 – completes a 
rights-curbing retreat that nullifies the autonomous worth of the primary rights-
driven preference for individual assessments. It may be that Brey still applies where 
States have not enacted generalised exclusion as part of their national rules. 
Ironically, Dano saves that more severe regulatory step when taken. The judgment 
thus achieves the harder outcome of the abandoned draft of Article 24(2), so it cannot 
be claimed straightforwardly that the result in Dano represents a more authentic 
version of citizenship rights intended by the legislature.  
Finally, the Court also ruled out the application of the Charter in the 
circumstances of the case. The referring court asked ‘whether Articles 1 [human 
dignity], 20 [equality before the law] and 51 of the Charter must be interpreted as 
requiring the Member States to grant Union citizens non-contributory cash benefits 
by way of basic provision such as to enable permanent residence or whether those 
States may limit their grant to the provision of funds necessary for return to the 
home State’.121 The Court responded:  
 
[Regulation 883/2004] is not intended to lay down the conditions creating 
the right to those benefits. It is thus for the legislature of each Member 
State to lay down those conditions. Accordingly, since those conditions 
result neither from Regulation No 883/2004 nor from Directive 2004/38 or 
                                                     
119 Dano, para. 80. 
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other secondary EU legislation, and the Member States thus have 
competence to determine the conditions for the grant of such benefits, 
they also have competence…to define the extent of the social cover 
provided by that type of benefit. Consequently, when the Member States 
lay down the conditions for the grant of special non-contributory cash 
benefits and the extent of such benefits, they are not implementing EU law.122 
 
The Court recalled that ‘the Charter, pursuant to Article 51(2) thereof, does not 
extend the field of application of EU law beyond the powers of the European Union 
or establish any new power or task for [it] or modify powers and tasks as defined in 
the Treaties’.123 Moreover, ‘Article 51(1)…states that the provisions of the Charter are 
addressed ‘to the Member States only when they are implementing Union law’.124  
However, the Court fixated in Dano on the input of EU secondary legislation 
and did not cite its broader characterisation of ‘implementing Union law’ in Åkerberg 
Fransson i.e. when national legislation ‘falls within the scope of European Union law’.125 
How can national legislation that excludes certain Union citizens from eligibility for 
social assistance not fall within the scope of Union law? In Stewart, the Court ruled 
that ‘[s]ituations falling within the material scope of EU law include those involving 
the exercise of the fundamental freedoms guaranteed by the Treaties, in particular those 
involving the freedom to move and reside…as conferred by Article 21 TFEU’.126 The 
Court had said explicitly in Dano that the national rules at issue delivered an 
objective of Article 7(1)(b) of the Directive. Its thin approach to the scope of the 
Charter thus shaved away another layer of scrutiny over conditions and limits.127  
Overall, it now seems insufficient to exercise free movement as a fact. It is no 
longer clear if citizens authorised to reside on the basis of national law (like Mrs 
Martínez Sala) would still have benefit from equal treatment rights outside the 
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structure of the Directive. After all, she did not, drawing from Article 24(1), reside in 
Germany on its basis. This issue is returned to in Section 4. However, the residence 
right extended to Mr Baumbast, by mitigation through proportionality of the 
legislative requirement of sickness insurance for all risks, would no longer seem 
feasible. Moreover, as Thym has argued, it is not that the right to reside in the host 
State is being limited in Dano. Instead, the judgment suggests that no right tor reside 
exists to be limited in the first place if Article 7(1) conditions are not met.128 This 
suggests that the Baumbast boundary between regulating the exercise and existence of 
free movement rights has therefore now been crossed.  
Thym also notes that case law on access to social assistance for economically 
inactive citizens concerns ‘a group…whose overall numbers may be small, but which 
are, nonetheless, the centre of legal and political debates’.129 Diluting equal treatment 
rights for these citizens becomes a barometer for the autonomous content of 
citizenship; for what depth of substance the status actually contributes beyond the 
practice of economic activity. Interestingly, notwithstanding the national court’s 
finding that sufficient resources were lacking, there is no reminder to Germany to 
consider the deportation of Ms Dano and her son.130 This omission might be seen as a 
positive step on one view. But it draws attention to a class of Union citizens who are 
passively tolerated yet not actively supported where they reside. This idea is developed 
further in Section 4.2, considering the grey legal space that these citizens occupy and 
the deepening polarity between persons sharing a status under but not the protection 
of EU law. The Court is undoubtedly between a rock and a (very) hard place as the 
original defender of a version of citizenship too detached from a wider mood of 
integration estrangement. But the constitutional price paid through Dano was too 
high, however sympathetic the metric of evaluation might be. The Court neither 
reconciled rooted case law on conditions and limits with its revised logic, nor openly 
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reversed it. The result is a distorted and unconvincing jurisprudence; but more 
fundamentally, a status splintered further into tiers and, ultimately, diminished. 
 
3.2. Inflation: acquiring permanent residence 
 
We saw in Section 2.1.2 that the European Parliament added a legal residence 
condition to the requirement of continuous residence for the purposes of Article 
16(1) of Directive 2004/38. Initial reflections on legal residence outlined two 
alternatives: one mapped case law emphasising the overarching weight of primary 
rights;131 but the other prioritised the internal scheme of the Directive. Recital 17 
notes the hope that permanent residence will ‘strengthen the feeling of Union 
citizenship’ and that it is ‘a key element in promoting social cohesion’. It then states 
that the right should be ‘laid down for all Union citizens and their family members 
who have resided in the host Member State in compliance with the conditions laid down 
in this Directive during a continuous period of five years without becoming subject to 
an expulsion measure’. In Lassal, AG Trstenjak suggested that ‘there is something to 
be said for interpreting…recital 17 to mean that a right of permanent residence…can 
arise only where the continuous period of five years’ residence was completed in 
accordance with the provisions of [Union] law’.132 She developed the point in Dias, 
judgment in which was delivered four months after Ruiz Zambrano.  
The key question in Dias was whether residence completed on the basis of a 
valid permit issued by national authorities could count as legal residence for the 
purposes of Article 16. AG Trstenjak acknowledged that the wording of the 
provision is ‘sufficiently open’ to accommodate such periods; 133 but argued that 
‘[w]hat is decisive is thus the spirit and purpose behind the European Union 
legislature’s adoption of Article 16’, noting that recital 17 was introduced by the 
Council.134 The Court reached similar conclusions, relying on the standard premise 
                                                     
131 E.g. AG Kokott in McCarthy, EU:C:2010:718, paras 51-53 (emphasis added); citing, inter alia, 
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that permits are declaratory rather than constitutive of residence rights in an 
atypically rights-curbing way.135 But the beginnings of a dynamic of inflation emerge 
when the Court compares periods of residence in a host State on the basis of national 
law with periods of absence, which are expressly covered by Article 16(4): 
 
Even though [Article 16(4)] refers only to absences from the host Member State, 
the integration link between the person concerned and that Member State is also 
called into question in the case of a citizen who, while having resided legally 
for a continuous period of five years, then decides to remain in that Member 
State without having a right of residence. [T]he integration objective which 
lies behind the acquisition of the right of permanent residence…is based not 
only on territorial and time factors but also on qualitative elements, relating to the 
level of integration in the host Member State. As the situations are comparable, it 
follows that the rule laid down in Article 16(4)…must also be applied by analogy 
to periods in the host Member State completed on the basis solely of a 
residence permit validly issued under Directive 68/360, without the 
conditions governing entitlement to a right of residence of any kind having 
been satisfied ...136 
 
This reasoning transposes the ambition of integration to a discourse of obligation and 
responsibility, reflecting the implied duties discussed in Section 2.2. The judgment in 
Ziolkowski and Sjeja (delivered five months later, at the end of 2011) amplifies that 
impression. This case addressed another dimension of legal residence: could periods 
of residence in a host State during which a Union citizen did not meet the conditions 
of Article 7(1) of the Directive be counted?  
In Ziolkowski and Sjeja, residence permits had been granted on humanitarian 
grounds to Polish nationals residing in Germany. Neither of the applicants had 
sufficient resources – a fact that affected the extension of their permits and in light of 
which the question of whether they resided legally was raised. The Court framed its 
judgment by first referring to the McCarthy version of the purpose of the Directive i.e. 
to set the conditions governing the exercise of free movement and residence rights.137 
It continued its cross-fertilisation across different provisions of the Directive from 
Dias, noting the express requirement in Articles 12(2) and 13(2) that the family 
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members of a Union citizen are required to meet the conditions of Article 7 to acquire 
permanent residence in the event of the citizen’s death or departure or situations of 
divorce, annulment of marriage, or termination of registered partnership. On that 
basis, ‘[i]t follows that the concept of legal residence implied by the terms “have 
resided legally” in Article 16(1)…should be construed as meaning a period of 
residence which complies with the conditions laid down in the directive, in 
particular those set out in Article 7(1)’.138 However, noting that both the Treaty and 
formative case law require that limits and conditions be laid down as a general 
requirement, why does it ‘follow’ that conditions laid down in certain provisions of 
the Directive also apply to other provisions from which they are actually absent?139  
 Tying permanent residence to compliance with Article 7 of the Directive also 
has consequences for residence authorised by other strands of EU law. In particular, 
in situations involving the completion of education for the children of migrant 
workers, residence rights in a host State – for the children and their primary carers if 
relevant – are conferred by Regulation 492/2011 i.e. not by Directive 2004/38 but still 
by Union law. These individuals are exempt from the requirement to have sufficient 
resources.140 However, in Alarape and Tijani, the Court ruled that while there is no 
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obligation to meet the Article 7 conditions in such cases, periods of residence 
completed without doing so could not generate permanent residence rights.141  
The conditional framework of integration applied in the permanent residence 
case law thus confirms the ascension of implied duties; but in a primarily 
instrumental way, as signalled by AG Bot: 
 
The ratio of the judgment in Ziolkowski and Szeja seems to me to be…the need 
to preserve the balance, desired by the Union legislature, between, on the one 
hand, requirements of freedom of movement and integration and, on the 
other, the financial interests of the Member States…In fact, since the ‘quality’ 
of integration is measured exclusively in the light of the condition of financial 
autonomy…it would be more realistic to infer that the conditions governing 
the acquisition of the right of permanent residence are ultimately independent 
of the level of integration of the claimant in the host Member State.142 
 
He also noted that since ‘[t]he link with the exercise of an economic activity, which is 
considered to allow a sufficient level of integration to be presumed, may, consequently, 
prove very tenuous, in particular where the Union citizen through whom the child 
holds his rights worked several years previously and for a very short period’, it 
‘seems logical that children pursuing their studies should themselves be required to 
satisfy the requirements of Directive 2004/38’.143 But the financial situation of the 
family will rarely, if ever, fall within the control of minor Union citizens. Even 
accepting that conditions should ask for more than mere presence in a host State for 
more than five years, it is odd that education there does not create the kind of 
qualitative integration that the case law aims to prescribe.144 The result of not valuing 
this kind of integration is that children who may have been educated in the same 
State for most of their lives will have to start the residence-clock from scratch as 
adults to access the enhanced citizenship rights of permanent residence – something 
acknowledged by AG Bot but accepted as justifiable in the interests of the legal 
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certainty.145 It was stated in Section 3.1 that concerns about clarity and practical 
workability are absolutely valid. But they call for clearer and better legislation. By 
amplifying conditions and limits through case law instead, financial self-sufficiency 
ingests the substance of integration rather than constituting one element of a more 
rounded framework for assessing it; and that theme has clear parallels with the 
ingestion of equal treatment by Article 24 of the Directive seen above. 
Paradoxically, rights-curbing outcomes are evident in another sector of 
permanent residence case law precisely through taking a broader look at each 
integration story i.e. beyond compliance with Article 7(1) in isolation. In Onuekwere, 
the Court ruled that periods of time spent in prison in a host State do not constitute 
legal residence; neither does that event pause the residence-clock so that rights might 
be acquired by aggregating periods in a host State before and after imprisonment.146 
The first premise of the reasoning was short-lived. Mr Onuekwere is a Nigerian 
national, married to an Irish national residing in the UK. The Court applied a literal 
reading of the fact that Article 16(2) extends permanent residence rights to family 
members who ‘have legally resided with the Union citizen in the host Member State 
for a continuous period of five years’.147 When Mr Onuekwere was in prison, he 
obviously did not live ‘with’ his wife. But the severe implications of reading that 
condition so literally – spouses live separately for all kinds of reasons, including 
work or serious illness – were retracted in Ogieriakhi six months later (though with 
no reference to Onuekwere there at all). What was stated, ironically enough, was that 
a literal reading of Article 16(2) would not be ‘consistent with the need not to 
construe Directive 2004/38 narrowly’.148  
The second argument in Onuekwere links the social cohesion and ‘feeling of 
citizenship’ aims of recital 17 with the qualitative elements of integration highlighted 
in Dias. The Court reasoned that ‘the undermining of the link of integration between 
the person concerned and the host Member State justifies the loss of the right of 
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permanent residence even outside the circumstances mentioned in Article 16(4) of [the] 
Directive’149 – again defying the Treaty requirement that conditions and limits must 
be laid down. In its view, ‘[t]he imposition of a prison sentence by the national court 
is such as to show the non-compliance by the person concerned with the values 
expressed by the society of the host Member State in its criminal law, with the result 
that the taking into consideration of periods of imprisonment for the purposes of the 
acquisition [of permanent residence] would clearly be contrary to the aim pursued 
by that directive in establishing that right’.150  
Azoulai has argued that ‘by stating that [the] objective [of promoting social 
cohesion] is perfectly consistent with the fact that the EU legislature made the 
acquisition of the right of permanent residence “subject to integration of the citizen of 
the Union in the host MS”, the Court changes the meaning of their concept of social 
cohesion. In this sense social cohesion is not about extending the possibility of 
creating bonds and promoting news forms of solidarity in Europe. It is mainly about 
respecting the particular value system of the host Member State’.151 The judgments 
on permanent residence are not then about a duty to integrate per se. They conceive 
a duty to integrate properly. That is done, first, by inflating the condition of legal 
residence in Article 16(1) and, second, by introducing a profile of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ 
Union citizens.152  Similar themes emerge in the discussion on protection against 
expulsion below.  
 
3.3. Disruption: protection against expulsion 
 
In Section 2.1.2, we saw that the importance placed by the legislature on duration of 
residence in a host State also found expression in the incremental framework for 
                                                     
149 Onuekwere, para. 25 (emphasis added). 
150 Onuekwere, para. 26; rejecting aggregation of residence periods for the same reason, see 
para. 31. 
151 Azoulai, n66 above, 16 (emphasis in original). 
152 Ibid, 11; Nic Shuibhne and Shaw, ‘General Report – Union citizenship: development, 
impact and challenges’ in Neergaard, Jacqueson, and Holst-Christensen (eds.), The XXVI 
FIDE Congress in Copenhagen 2014: Congress Publications Vol. 2 (DJOEF Publishing, 2014), 137 
and 223-224; Coutts ‘Union citizenship as probationary citizenship: Onuekwere’ (2015) 52:2 
CMLRev 531. 
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protection against expulsion in Articles 27 and 28 of the Directive. These provisions 
set three levels of protection: (1) Article 27(1): public policy, public security or public 
health for those who do not have permanent residence; (2) Article 28(2): serious 
grounds of public policy or public security after the acquisition of permanent 
residence; and (3) Article 28(3): imperative grounds of public security only for periods 
of residence exceeding ten years or for minors. However, notwithstanding the 
distinctions embedded in these levels, case law on expulsion displays the same 
recent shift towards limiting rights – but here, in disruption of the will of the 
legislature. In contrast to the case law on social assistance, where Article 24(1) of the 
Directive narrowed primary law, expulsion case law narrows the Directive.  
 The scope of Article 28 was first addressed in Tsakouridis. The Court framed 
its judgment by referring to the primary and individual nature of the right to move 
and reside, noting that the Directive ‘aims in particular to strengthen that right’.153 
The Court also recognised the deliberate deepening of protection built into Article 28: 
 
[B]y subjecting all expulsion measures in the cases referred to in Article 28(3)…to 
the existence of ‘imperative grounds’ of public security, a concept which is 
considerably stricter than that of ‘serious grounds’ within the meaning of Article 
28(2), the European Union legislature clearly intended to limit measures based on 
Article 28(3) to ‘exceptional circumstances’, as set out in recital 24 in the preamble 
to that directive. The concept of ‘imperative grounds of public security’ 
presupposes not only the existence of a threat to public security, but also that 
such a threat is of a particularly high degree of seriousness….154 
 
It then held that ‘objectives such as the fight against crime in connection with dealing 
in narcotics as part of an organised group are [not] necessarily excluded from’155 the 
concept of public security – a finding criticised for ‘blur[ring] the distinction’ 
between Articles 28(2) and (3).156 However, the obligation on national authorities to 
consider all relevant factors in each individual case was strongly affirmed.157  
 It was seen in Section 3.2 that application of qualitative integration analysis 
results in the loss of permanent residence eligibility for citizens imprisoned in host 
                                                     
153 Case C-145/09 Tsakouridis, EU:C:2010:708, para. 23. 
154 Tsakouridis, paras 40-41 (emphasis added). 
155 Tsakouridis, para. 45. 
156 Kostakopoulou, n66 above, 458-459 
157 Tsakouridis, paras 30-33 and 48-53. 
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States. In G, the same ‘vital consideration’ was held to condition enhanced protection 
against expulsion.158 Again framed by the consequences of failing to accomplish 
genuine integration, it was held that ‘unlike the requisite period for acquiring a right 
of permanent residence, which begins when the person concerned commences lawful 
residence in the host Member State, the 10-year period of residence necessary for the 
grant of the enhanced protection provided for in Article 28(3)(a)…must be calculated 
by counting back from the date of the decision ordering that person’s expulsion’.159 A 
condition of continuous residence was also read into the provision.160 These findings 
already contract the intended distinction between levels of protection in the Directive. 
But in the 2012 judgment in I, the distinction breaks down completely.161  
In May 2006, Mr I, who was born in Italy but had lived in Germany since 1987, 
was sentenced to imprisonment for sexual offences committed against his former 
partner’s daughter. The referring court asked whether Mr I’s actions constituted 
imperative grounds of public security, which, noting the duration of his residence in 
Germany, would be necessary for expulsion to be considered. The Court first 
recalled Tsakouridis on the intended distinction between serious and imperative 
grounds of public security, reiterating that the latter concept is ‘considerably stricter’. 
In Tsakouridis, the Court invoked classic case law on public security, recalling that its 
scope covers both the internal and external security of a State and that ‘a threat to the 
functioning of the institutions and essential public services and the survival of the 
population, as well as the risk of a serious disturbance to foreign relations or to 
peaceful coexistence of nations, or a risk to military interests, may affect public 
security’.162  While fully recognising the seriousness of the acts at issue in I, the 
applicant’s conduct could not meet that definition.163 But the Court confirmed only 
                                                     
158 G, n147 above, paras 32-33. 
159 Ibid, para. 24 (emphasis added). 
160 Ibid, paras 25-27. 
161 In a blistering critique, Kochenov and Pirker argue that the judgment is ‘a clear ultra-vires 
action…a contra legem interpretation of Directive 2004/38 coupled with a systemic departure 
from the fundamental principles of European integration’ (‘Deporting the citizens within the 
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Stadt Remscheid’ 19 Columbia Journal of European Law (2013) 369 at 372). 
162 Tsakouridis, para. 44. 
163 As AG Bot acknowledged; EU:C:2010:322, paras 44-46 of the Opinion. 
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the internal/external security point from Tsakouridis and did not repeat the concrete 
examples cited there. Instead, it referred to various instruments of EU law to 
underline the particularly serious nature of the sexual abuse and sexual exploitation 
of children,164 and recast the essence of public security to fit the offences in the case: 
 
[I]t is open to the Member States to regard criminal offences such as those 
referred to in…Article 83(1) TFEU as constituting a particularly serious threat 
to one of the fundamental interests of society, which might pose a direct threat 
to the calm and physical security of the population and thus be covered by the 
concept of ‘imperative grounds of public security’, capable of justifying an 
expulsion measure under Article 28(3) of Directive 2004/38, as long as the 
manner in which such offences were committed discloses particularly serious 
characteristics, which is a matter for the referring court to determine on the 
basis of an individual examination of the specific case before it.165 
 
This definition – which refers not ‘to the institutions or components of the State…but 
rather…a heightened threat to underlying values of society’ 166  – hands an 
extraordinary degree of expulsion power (back) to national authorities in the face of 
extensive evidence that not even the baseline protections of the Directive are 
properly applied already.167 It contravenes both the wording and purpose of Article 
28(3).168 In particular, it writes public policy into that provision even though the 
legislature deliberately left it out. 169 It departs from the standard rights 
broadly/derogations narrowly paradigm that is especially vital in situations of 
expulsion. The revitalisation of punishment-plus-banishment is difficult to square 
with the objective of rehabilitation, rooted in human dignity and committed to by the 
States,170 yet it feeds a misplaced expectation that States can always exclude ‘bad’ 
Union citizens – as if the intended strengthening of protection through the Directive 
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166 Azuolai and Coutts, ‘Restricting Union citizen’s residence rights on grounds of public 
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had never happened.171 The decision thus underscores the argument that recent case 
law exceeds respect for the will of the legislature.  
However, Azoulai and Coutts offer a ‘more generous interpretation’ of the 
judgment, suggesting that it ‘add[s] to the substance of Union citizenship by 
complementing the rights of the Directive with correlative obligations’ and arguing: 
 
… Union citizenship should not be seen as an individual prerogative, but as 
part of a broader process of interaction whereby the obligation of the Member 
State to recognise the migrant is mirrored by the obligation of the migrant to 
recognise the common space of values he or she is given to live in, in the form 
that is particularised in the host society...The transnational rights of Union 
citizenship carry with them correlative duties to comply with the common 
values of the Union’s public order…That is not to say that these duties (to 
obey criminal law) are placed only on migrant citizens. They hold too for the 
nationals of the host Member State. However, the consequences of their 
breach are different and indeed more severe for Union citizens…[T]he right 
to reside on the territory of other Member States and their societies is 
necessarily more contingent, subject to recognition and open to forfeiture, 
than that enjoyed by nationals of that State.172 
 
Azoulai and Coutts raise vital questions here about the appropriate balance of rights 
and limits within Union citizenship. In particular, the sense that free movement law 
has promoted the worth of individual choice above pretty much all else is open to 
strong critique. Davies put it bluntly by characterising citizenship as ‘narcissistic’ if it 
is built on a tactic of ‘glorifying the individual and humiliating the state’, and could 
‘result in backlash’.173 However, we need to be careful that responses to disaffection 
do not empty the status of citizenship either. To Kochenov’s caution that ‘[a]ny 
system based on duties necessarily implies a strong predetermined set of 
                                                     
171 Kostakopoulou and Ferreira, ‘Testing liberal norms: the public policy and public security 
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172 Azoulai and Coutts, n166 above, 568 and 570. See similarly, Azoulai, n66 above, 9. 
173 Davies ‘The humiliation of the state as a constitutional tactic’ in Amtenbrink and van den 
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prescriptions of good and bad and right and wrong’,174 we should add the risk 
highlighted by Spaventa: ‘the idea that there are qualitative criteria that can be 
imposed on Union citizens leaves the door open to further qualifications’.175 The 
development of duties outside legislation undoes much of the progress made 
towards taking seriously the ‘equalising dimensions’ of Union citizenship as a 
fundamental status. 176  In Tsakouridis, AG Bot articulated the consequences of 
founding an area of free movement:  
[T]he creation of a common space for living and moving also requires account 
to be taken, in the overall interest of that communal space…of the 
phenomenon of delinquency, even if it means developing common means of 
preventing and combating it…That space cannot be constructed on the basis 
of returning any severely punished offender to the Member State of origin, 
solely on grounds of the penalty imposed.177 
 
States inevitably treat the nationals of other States differently since they ‘cannot 
remove [their own nationals] from national territory or deny them access to that 
territory. However, that does not mean that the sanctions applied to a Member 
State’s own nationals and to nationals of other Member States may be entirely 
different’.178 By diluting the intended scope of imperative grounds of public security 
in I, the Court converted an exceptional protection against expulsion into a route 
towards it. The collapsing of the test into the more generic concept of public policy 
has profound implications for the residence-stability of citizens.179 It exacerbates ‘the 
stigmatisation of difference’ even though ‘the promotion of exclusion and the 
stigmatisation of difference are straightforwardly antithetical to the objectives which 
                                                     
174 Kochenov, n57 above, 484. 
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the Union is set to achieve’.180 In common with the judgment in Dano and those on 
permanent residence, the ruling suggests that ‘unlawful presence brings about no 
legally significant quality of social integration under EU law’.181 It thereby fortifies the 
apparently unshakeable primacy of nationality.  
Addressing Directive 2004/38, Davies is right that ‘there has never been any 
serious policy argument about whether such conditions should exist, since there is a 
broad consensus that entirely removing them could have harmful effects on national 
institutions and finances, not to mention politics. Debate is about exactly what those 
conditions should be’.182 The case law on expulsion brings another dimension to that 
debate. It involves reconstitution of what the conditions should be irrespective and in 
disruption of what they actually still are. Recent case law on social assistance can be 
linked to the application of legislation, even if it does raise difficult constitutional 
questions. The inflation of conditions in case law on permanent residence can 
arguably be linked to the measure’s broader scheme, even if this involves revised 
readings of its purpose and objectives. But the disruption of the Directive in case law 
on protection against expulsion crosses another line altogether.  
 
4. Implications: the hardening schism of citizenship categories 
 
The case law shift presented in Section 3 exhibits generalisation and hardening of the 
conditions, limits, and duties of Union citizenship. The changing legal shape that 
results requires us to question if the existence – and not just the exercise – of free 
movement rights has been undermined and whether the claim that Union citizenship 
is a fundamental status can be sustained. The consolidation and simplification 
objectives of Directive 2004/38 may have been achieved through the creation of rules 
that apply differently to different categories of citizen. But the increasingly harsh 
application – and extension – of that framework reveals a problematic diffusion of 
rights in reality. Union citizenship looks less like a status rooted in rights and more 
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like an increasingly qualified privilege 183  – with mutable channels of admission, 
especially where restrictions are not provided for or laid down.  
In this section, it will first be shown that the conventional approach to 
conditions, limits and duties still applies for certain categories of citizen: essentially, 
for the economically active. The contrasting position of another category of citizen is 
then considered – the tolerated citizen who is not expelled from a host State but is not 
supported there either; who might be lawfully resident under national or Union law 
beyond the Directive but is excluded from permanent residence rights; or who may 
have resided in a host State for several years but is nevertheless excluded from 
enhanced protection against expulsion. Formative case law aimed to converge the 
status and protection of both categories of citizen; but more recently, their fates have 
been riven. While it might be argued that these developments increasingly reflect the 
wider political mood across the Union, or at least the governments of certain 
Member States, the legal problem is that stronger rights that were previously 
connected to and entrenched at the level of primary EU law have been reduced – 
without any changes to, or even sufficient discussion of, their Treaty source. 
 
4.1. Still fundamental 
 
The conditions in Article 7(1) of the Directive are the gateway to free movement: if 
they can be satisfied, a multiverse of rights and privileges unfolds for ‘good’ citizens. 
In Dano, the Court separated out the two statuses within that provision, 
distinguishing between ‘(i) persons who are working and (ii) those who are not. 
Under Article 7(1)(a)…the first group of Union citizens in the host Member State 
have the right of residence without having to fulfil any other condition. On the other 
hand, persons who are economically inactive are required by Article 7(1)(b)…to meet 
the condition that they have sufficient resources of their own’.184  The idea that 
economically active citizens do not have to fulfil ‘any other condition’ is an 
                                                     
183 See Coutts, n152 above, 543-545, on Union citizenship as ‘probationary citizenship’, noting 
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entrenched norm of free movement law and of Article 45 TFEU in particular.185 In 
striking contrast to the legitimacy of protecting public finances in citizenship law 
generally, the Court asserts that ‘[t]o accept budgetary concerns may justify a 
difference in treatment between migrant workers and national workers would imply 
that the application and the scope of a rule of EU law as fundamental as non-
discrimination on grounds of nationality might vary in time and place according to the 
state of the public finances of Member States’.186 O’Brien rightly concludes from this 
that ‘the self-evident truth of the fundamental law of non-discrimination dissolves 
when dealing with non-workers’.187 
Similarly, linking back to Section 3.1.2, the question of intention – central for 
citizens who are not economically active in Dano – continues to be set aside for 
situations involving the free movement of workers. 188  For both groups, the 
assessment turns on whether access to social assistance or other social advantages 
was the sole objective of the mobile citizen. But the functional taking up of effective 
(per Kempf) part-time work provides absolution. The Court was clear on this point in 
N, ruling that enjoyment of free movement rights under Article 45 TFEU may not ‘be 
made contingent on which objectives are being pursued by a national of a Member 
State in applying to enter the territory of a host Member State, provided that he pursues or 
wishes to pursue effective and genuine employment activities. Once that condition is 
satisfied, the motives which may have prompted a worker of a Member State to seek 
employment in another Member State are of no account and must not be taken into 
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consideration’.189 It is perhaps unsurprising but still poignant to find in N precisely the 
phrases that also once shaped the Court’s case law on citizens who are not 
economically active.190 
In another parallel with formative case law on citizenship rights, when the 
wording of the Directive pushes against the priority accorded to economic activity, 
the Court goes outside the Directive and back to primary law. As well as benefits for 
jobseekers, noted in Section 3.1, another example concerns the retention of worker 
status. We saw in Section 3.2 that periods in prison could not be counted towards 
acquisition of permanent residence rights. However, in earlier case law, the Court 
ruled that ‘in respect…of prisoners who were employed before their imprisonment, 
the fact that the person concerned was not available on the employment market 
during such imprisonment does not mean, as a general rule, that he did not continue to be 
duly registered as belonging to the labour force of the host Member State during that period, 
provided that he actually finds another job within a reasonable time after his release’.191 
In Saint Prix, the Court drew an unlikely connection between imprisonment and 
pregnancy to extend the same protection of residence status for the citizen concerned. 
Article 7(3) of Directive 2004/38 establishes circumstances in which a Union citizen 
who is no longer employed or self-employed retains that status in a host State: being 
temporarily unable to work because of illness or accident; certain situations of 
involuntary unemployment; and entering vocational training. But the Court 
concluded in Saint Prix that Article 7(3) does not ‘[list] exhaustively the 
circumstances in which a migrant worker who is no longer in an employment 
relationship may nevertheless continue to benefit from that status’:192  
 
The codification…of the instruments of EU law existing prior to [the] 
directive, which expressly seeks to facilitate the exercise of the rights of Union 
citizens to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States, 
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cannot, by itself, limit the scope of the concept of worker within the meaning of the 
FEU Treaty. In that regard…the concept of ‘worker’, within the meaning of 
Article 45 TFEU, in so far as it defines the scope of a fundamental freedom 
provided for by the FEU Treaty, must be interpreted broadly ...193  
 
Applying Orfanopoulos and Oliveri, the Court carried over the condition that citizens 
who cease work because of pregnancy must return to economic activity ‘within a 
reasonable time’ to retain the status of worker and thus the security of their residence 
rights in the host State into the future – requiring an individual-centred assessment. 
But what are the implications when these citizens are between jobs: Ms Saint 
Prix retains the status of worker, but is she legally resident under Article 7(1)(a) of the 
Directive even though she is not actually working and may be dependent on social 
assistance? If she is dependent on social assistance, could the relevant period be 
counted towards permanent residence? Ziolkowski and Sjeja would suggest not, 
placing limits even on the privileges generated by a starting point of economic 
activity. If the Court rules otherwise in a future case, deciding that such situations 
remain should under the shield of Article 7(1)(a), the chasm between categories of 
citizen will gape further still.  
From the perspective of methods of interpretation, the decision in Saint Prix 
confirms that primary rights still make a decisive difference in free movement law: 
just not, any longer, for all categories of citizen. In Commission v Netherlands, AG 
Sharpston communicated this in terms of the inherent limits of Union citizenship 
law: ‘Directive 2004/38…maintains the distinction between EU citizens who have 
exercised an economic right of free movement and other EU citizens and expressly 
preserves the right of Member States to discriminate for a certain time against the latter’.194 
In other words, a degree of inequality between categories of citizen is a constituent 
feature of the free movement rights attached to Union citizenship. However, the 
Court originally engaged citizenship as a fundamental status to mediate through law 
                                                     
193 Saint Prix, paras 32-33 (emphasis added); see also, the Opinion of AG Wahl (EU:C:2013:841, 
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between aspiration and reality. And let us not forget a key reason for that: because 
the practice of citizenship in the States has been persistently problematic.195  
 
4.2. Less fundamental 
 
It was shown in Section 3.1.2 that the obligation on host States to extend equal 
treatment to the nationals of other States was hooked in Dano to Article 24(1) of the 
Directive i.e. ‘all Union citizens and their family members residing in a Member State 
on the basis of this Directive should enjoy…equal treatment with nationals…subject to 
such specific provisions as are expressly provided for in the Treaty and secondary law’. In 
particular, the Court ruled that citizens who do not comply with the conditions in 
Article 7(1) could not in turn claim a right of residence in a host State under the 
Directive. But where citizens can establish a right to reside outwith the Directive – 
under either national or other streams of Union law – do corollary equal treatment 
obligations then bind host States? Or has the right to move and reside now been 
hinged entirely on the Article 7 requirements? 
In Martínez Sala, the Court ruled that ‘a citizen of the European 
Union…lawfully resident in the territory of a host Member State can rely on Article 
[18 TFEU] in all situations which fall within the scope ratione materiae of [Union] 
law’.196 The applicant was acknowledged to have a positive right to reside in Germany 
that existed ‘solely by virtue of national legislation’.197 In Grzelczyk, the Court stated 
that equal treatment for the grant of a subsistence allowance depended on a student 
being legally resident in the host State; noted that Directive 93/96 neither obliged nor 
precluded the payment of benefits to students; and emphasised individual-centred 
assessments including consideration of whether financial difficulties were temporary. 
The Court confirmed that its analysis did not ‘prevent a Member State from taking 
the view that a student who has recourse to social assistance no longer fulfils the 
                                                     
195 A constant theme in the Commission’s oversight of the enforcement of citizenship rights: 
see e.g. Communication on guidance for better transposition n206 above; and EU Citizenship 
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conditions of his right of residence or from taking measures, within the limits 
imposed by [Union] law, either to withdraw his residence permit or not to renew 
it’.198 But it is not clear if the Court was suggesting that a residence right under EU 
law might be sustained where an individual did not meet the conditions in 
legislation in full – as it later said explicitly in Baumbast – or whether some positive, 
rights-ending action was required on the part of the host State.199  
In Trojani, the applicant’s residence status was more like the circumstances in 
Martínez Sala: he was not economically active and he did not satisfy the requirement 
to have sufficient resources in Directive 90/364. But ‘according to information put 
before the Court, Mr Trojani is lawfully resident in Belgium, as is attested by the 
residence permit which has in the meantime been issued to him by the municipal 
authorities’. 200  The Court confirmed that ‘while the Member States may make 
residence of a citizen of the Union who is not economically active conditional on his 
having sufficient resources, that does not mean that such a person cannot, during his 
lawful residence in the host Member State, benefit from the fundamental principle of 
equal treatment as laid down in Article [18 TFEU]’.201 But note paragraph 43: ‘with 
regard to such benefits, a citizen of the Union who is not economically active may 
rely on Article [18 TFEU] where he has been lawfully resident in the host Member State for 
a certain time or possesses a residence permit’ (emphasis added).  
Looking across these judgments, there are different versions of lawful 
residence in play for citizens who are not economically active beyond the rights tied 
specifically to the 1990s Directives, spanning lawful residence under national law 
and lawful residence under Union law. It could be suggested that Dano did not 
address the implications of residence rights acquired under national law since the 
applicant neither possessed a residence permit nor was authorised to reside in 
Germany, 202  and Article 24(1) of the Directive expresses the principle of equal 
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treatment with reference to citizens residing in a host State on the basis of the 
Directive. On one view, that wording allows space for application of the formative 
case law – of Article 18 TFEU – for citizens residing on a different basis. However, 
because of the compression of equal treatment from Article 18 into Article 24(1) of 
the Directive, it is not inconceivable that eligibility for social assistance is now 
implicitly ruled out even where residence is authorised by national law.203 For those 
who can link residence rights to other strands of Union law – for example, to 
Regulation 492/2011 – we saw in Section 3.2 that the conditions set down in Article 7 
of the Directive do not apply.204 But that finding does not establish a positive right to 
equal treatment; and eligibility for permanent residence rights – and enhanced 
protection against expulsion – has been ruled out in these circumstances.  
The nature of lawful residence therefore seems to have morphed from a 
status that could be established in different ways at either Union or national level 
into a status that must be established exclusively through limited elements of Union 
law – perhaps exclusively in line with the conditions and limits of the Directive. The 
finding in Trojani that ‘a citizen of the Union who is not economically active may rely 
on Article [18 TFEU] where he has been lawfully resident in the host Member State’ 
might now therefore be: where he has been lawfully resident in the host Member 
State in accordance with Directive 2004/38. The judgment in Dias provides a useful way 
to explain this. If residence permits are declaratory rather than constitutive of 
residence rights, a national residence permit is legally empty for the purpose of 
establishing rights under Union law.205  
But noting that Article 15 of the Directive does not permit States to attach a 
ban on re-entry to expulsion decisions issued ‘on grounds other than public policy, 
public security or public health’ and that, in reality, States progress to expulsion far 
                                                     
203 ‘To accept that persons who do not have a right of residence under Directive 2004/38 may claim 
entitlement to social benefits under the same conditions as those applicable to nationals of the 
host Member State would run counter to an objective of the directive…namely preventing 
Union citizens who are nationals of other Member States from becoming an unreasonable 
burden on the social assistance system’ (Dano, para. 74; emphasis added). 
204 Ibrahim, para. 59 (emphasis added). See further, Verschueren, n89 above, 377-381. 
205 That analogy also fits with the Court’s interpretation of Article 37 of the Directive in 
Ziolkowski and Szeja, n5 above, para. 50. 
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more rarely than migration rhetoric suggests,206 it is essential that we reflect on the 
citizens in these grey legal spaces – residing in a host State but not necessarily in 
conformity with Directive 2004/38; possibly residing unlawfully though possibly 
residing lawfully under either national law or another strand of Union law; and 
increasingly beyond the reach of equal treatment protection, permanent residence 
rights or enhanced protection against expulsion. If these Union citizens can engage in 
or even commit to engaging in economic activity, their status radically transforms. 
But it is simplistic to assume that it is always easy or even possible for citizens to 
effect that change – or at least to effect it by themselves.  
To demonstrate the futility of the increasingly splintered citizenship tiers that 
result, it is instructive to overlay templates from case law on economically activity on 
the circumstances of economically inactive citizens. As discussed in Section 3.1.1, 
Brey required review of each individual’s situation precisely to get a sense of his or 
her circumstances. That approach – underlining temporary difficulties in particular – 
accommodated a framework of shared responsibility: for citizens to transition 
towards self-sufficiency, but for the host State to facilitate that transition within 
reason – to support the citizen ‘in’ from the outer tiers of citizenship where possible. 
However, in Dano, the situation of the applicant was presented more starkly:  
 
Ms Dano attended school for three years in Romania, but did not obtain any 
leaving certificate. She understands German orally and can express herself 
simply in German. On the other hand, she cannot write in German and her 
ability to read texts in that language is only limited. She has not been trained 
in a profession and, to date, has not worked in Germany or Romania. 
Although her ability to work is not in dispute, there is nothing to indicate that 
she has looked for a job.207 
 
If Germany chooses not to deport Ms Dano, is there really no corollary responsibility 
to support her transition to a different status?208 Exportability case law – where the 
                                                     
206 See Thym, n128 above, on the situation in Germany; more generally, see the national 
reports in Neergaard, Jacqueson and Holst-Christensen (eds.), n152 above, responses to Q2 
and Q3 in particular.  
207 Dano, para. 39. 
208 See also, Verschueren, n89 above, noting that ‘the Union’s objectives to combat social 
exclusion, objectives enshrined in provisions such as Article 3(3) TEU, Articles 9 and 151(1) 
TFEU as well as Article 34(3) of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. Articles 1 (Human 
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impact of primary rights and fundamental status still abounds – provides an 
insightful comparative touchstone here. In Stewart, the Court recognised that ‘[t]he 
existence of [a genuine link] could effectively be established, in particular, by a 
finding that the person in question had been, for a reasonable period, actually present in 
that Member State’.209 The are strong parallels between the circumstances of Ms Dano 
and the criteria then outlined in more detail in Stewart, including being connected to 
the social security system already (Ms Dano received child benefit and maintenance 
support) and family circumstances (her son was born in the host State and both of 
them lived there with her sister).210 The Breys would find it far harder to demonstrate 
a similar level of integration in Austria or that the financial shortfall was temporary. 
Yet in their case, national authorities at least had to consider these factors before 
taking a final decision. Pushing a State more actively to the action of expulsion 
obviously produces severe consequences. But not doing so arguably engenders even 
murkier territory for tolerated citizens, irrespective of the duration for which they 
are merely left alone. This passive ‘starve them out’211 strategy will reduce public 
spending, on both social assistance and the bureaucratic costs of expulsion. But it is 
the antithesis of responsibility, and a sad point to have reached in the narrative of 
Union citizenship.  
There is thus a frustrating paradox at the heart of free movement: EU law 
does not care what you do if you have sufficient resources – but it does not care what 
you have if you engage in economic activity. The concept of liminality provides a 
compelling way to reflect on citizens in tolerated, but not supported, in-between 
situations. Laurie’s work on health research highlights one of liminality’s defining 
characteristics: it is fundamentally about transitioning between spaces, not being 
stuck.212 Otherwise, there is a risk of permanent liminality – of being status-less. That 
risk is strongly resonant with the recent shift seen across different pockets of the 
citizenship case law. Conditions and limits have been hardened and generalised to 
                                                                                                                                                        
dignity) and 24 (Children’s rights) 77 of the EU Charter could also play a role in the 
discussion’ (384; see further, 389-390). 
209 Stewart, n126 above, para. 93 (emphasis added). 
210 Stewart, paras 97-101. 
211 Thym, n128 above, 260. 
212 Laurie, ‘Liminality and the limits of law in health research regulation’ (2015) forthcoming. 
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exclude citizens from equal treatment, permanent residence, and protection against 
expulsion – in ways that are neither clearly laid down nor provided for, or 
developed in sympathy with the principles that otherwise characterise the Union 
legal order. What then is really left beyond free movement rights linked to economic 
activity, which were and still could be protected without any need for a status of 
Union citizenship at all? Hailbronner is right that ‘[s]o far, there are no indications 
that the responsibility of Member States for the welfare of their citizens are being 
replaced by mutual solidarity across the nationals of the Member States’.213 He also 
argued that ‘[t]he introduction of Union citizenship is not a sufficient explanation for 
a fundamental reconstruction of social rights of Union citizens’.214 But the latter point 
does not have to connect to the former: there can be reconstruction without 
replacement. Furthermore, reconstruction of free movement is a valid consequence of 
adding citizenship rights at Treaty level: what was the – legal – point of it otherwise?  
 
5. Conclusion 
 
This article has argued that the application and interpretation of the conditions, 
limits and, to some extent, duties of Union citizenship have shifted to displace 
established premises of primary rights review. It is not being claimed that free 
movement rights are – or should be – unlimited; that they are naively cost-free; or 
that free movement as one objective of the Union must always prevail above any 
other public interest concerns. Conditions, limits and duties have a legitimate place 
in free movement law. But the wording of Articles 20 and 21 TFEU, which allows for 
conditions and limits to be prescribed in secondary law, is not a carte blanche that 
exempts national authorities or Union institutions from the obligations inherent in 
the wider Union legal order. In particular, restrictions of rights must remain subject 
to the requirements of primary Union law – which includes the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights as well as the Treaties – and of the general principles of Union 
law. The Treaty requires that they must be laid down and provided for – benchmarks 
                                                     
213 Hailbronner, n88 above, 1267. 
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that have been disregarded in several cases. The ascent of secondary law as an 
exhaustive expression of equal treatment – when it has typically been precisely the 
other way around – is a particularly troubling example of mutation that recent case 
law has provoked. The explanation that Article 24(2) of the Directive limits Article 18 
TFEU by way of Article 21 TFEU (and possibly Article 52(2) of the Charter in 
relevant cases) induces normative migraine and undercuts five decades of 
understanding equal treatment as a legal principle of autonomous worth. The 
inflation and disruption of secondary legislation in other instances further 
contributes to the undermining of both aspirational and material claims of 
citizenship as the fundamental status of Member State nationals. 
 It would be misleading to claim that the injection of general principles into 
the framework of judicial review has been acclaimed without criticism. For example, 
commenting on Vatsouras and Koupatantze, Davies argued that ‘while it may seem 
reasonable that secondary legislation is subject to primary law, it should be 
remembered that the Treaty says nothing about work-seekers. When the Court 
speaks of interpreting in the light of Article 45 TFEU, it really means interpreting in 
the light of the castle of principles and idea that it has built, and which it jealously 
guards against legislative corruption’.215 But it is an inescapable legal fact that the 
Court, in its scrutiny of both Union and national measures restricting free movement 
rights, applies a filter of general principles. When that filter is set aside so strikingly, 
explicit articulation and careful explanation of the constitutional propriety of that 
decision are owed to Union citizens, not to mention the national authorities that must 
deal with it including the national courts. This is especially the case when previous 
case law has been apparently but not openly reversed.  
It is also critical that members of the Court of Justice ask themselves what it is 
they have actually been responding to in recent case law. It was demonstrated that 
that what is happening in citizenship law is only partly connected to the balance of 
                                                     
215 Davies, n105 above, 1600-01. Judgments preserving the system and character of EU law 
from undue (as defined by the Court) external interference are perhaps another dimension of 
the same criticism; see e.g. Case C-402/05 P Kadi, EU:C:2008:461; Opinion 1/13 on the draft 
agreement on the accession of the European Union to the European Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, EU:C:2014:2454. 
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powers between the legislature and the judiciary, and the rightful sharing of 
responsibility among all institutions for the shape and direction of the Union’s 
constitution. 216  O’Brien challenges us to do better than this, emphasising that 
‘[d]eference to the legislature does not make EU citizenship ideologically neutral, or 
immutable, and it does not discharge the duty of moral scrutiny’.217  
Law may well be ‘the product of the ages wrapped in the opinion of the 
moment’.218  But the dominant opinion of the moment – that most citizens who 
exercise free movement rights are a burden; and that most citizens who are not 
economically active have no intention of being so and deliberately abuse Union law – 
is hardly a representative or well-evidenced truth. 219  Thym suggests that free 
movement is performing a ‘symbolic function’ in public debate at present, ‘serv[ing] 
as a projection sphere for economic, social and political unease about wider 
globalization processes. If that is correct, the resulting political terrain is difficult to 
master. Actors involved need to respond to the concerns of the population, while 
also evading the pitfalls of scapegoating inherent in many policy responses to 
migratory phenomena’. 220  As Kostakopoulou has cautioned, ‘when the space 
between convictions and principles, on the one hand, and pure power politics, on the 
other, is left exposed, it is only proper that we keep wondering about the EU citizens’ 
place in this’.221 Who is standing up for Union citizens and for the rights that the 
Treaty confers on them now?  
It is true that Union citizenship was constructed as an asymmetric status 
more than a categorically fundamental one. It is also true that it is a contested status, 
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saturated with expectations that it cannot possibly deliver without fundamental 
political and societal change. That may never happen. Union citizenship has not 
transcended political and social contestation at a more fundamental level, and 
transnational solidarity is a work in painfully slow progress. For now, however, 
citizenship rights are part of primary EU law, and they were developed and 
protected in that light. The rights-curbing impulse that dominates recent case law 
may be understandable. It may be rationally explicable. It may even play a vital part 
in the preservation of harmonious EU relations overall. But it represents a tainted 
compromise. States had choices on conditions, limits and duties when adopting 
Directive 2004/38. If they intend to choose differently now, they should be 
responsible enough to do so through the legitimate channels of legislative action and 
Treaty change where needed. The Court should be responsible enough to guard the 
boundaries of existing primary rights until then. An even more critical question 
concerns the role of citizens themselves in the shaping of Union citizenship. But that 
merits another story. Meanwhile, ‘it would be unfortunate to make citizens bear the 
consequences of inaction by the [Union] institutions or of the negative attitude of the 
Member States with regard to the progress of European integration in the field of 
freedom of movement of persons’.222 
                                                     
222 Opinion of AG Cosmas in Wijsenbeek, n21 above, para. 111. 
